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STATEMENT RE: PARTIES PLAINTIFF
Sixty-two (62) individuals brought this action as plaintiffs: Dorothy E. Littrell;
James R. Briley; Rulon Yorgason; Charles L Magruder; Lily Magruder; Cristina H.
Rodriguez; Saul R. Aguilar; Milton Rodriguez; Rebecca P. Hernandez; Melinda
Fernandez Nix; Ramon Aguilar; Vivian M. Clay; Sherry Gallegos; Eddie J. Gallegos;
Afton L. Hoskins; Samuel Fernandez; Raymond D. Anderson; Mike Galbraith; Robert D.
Blair; Steven L. Zampedri; Thomas Mazoko; Helen Delgado; Donna L. Marti; Evo Marti;
Donald C. Marsing; Senorina D. Fernandez; Epifano Gallegos; Ishelle Eastman; Gabriel
Martinez; Basil Beech; Sharon Beech; Don K. Wilson; David Thompson; Jeremy Kilgore;
Amanda Kilgore; Nanci Byers; Brook Larsen; Katie Spendlove; Jason Rusch; David L.
Rusch; Cynthia Rusch; Laneil Larsen; Lavere W. Rawlins; F. Craig Hazen; Keith Tisher;
Robert H. Cato; Thomas I. Dolph; Lillian Medina; Art Fraga; Dina Fraga; Dawn Fraga;
Pedro Hernandez; Sr.; John Hernandez; Jackie Watkins; Herlinda Hernandez; Phillip
Fernandez; Felicia Fernandez; Linda Fraga; Zack B. Blairo; and, Ronnie Hales. R. 1-44.
Four (4) plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims prior to the October 23, 2007
hearing. Those were Don K. Wilson, Brook Larsen, Laneil Larsen, and, Robert H. Cato
R. 88; 90; 211.
These sixty-two (62) plaintiffs are not parties to this appeal.

PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS
There are no prior or related appeals.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DOROTHY LITTRELL, et al,
Plaintiffs,
BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 20080752

CINDI MANSELL, Ogden City Recorder;
GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney; and,
MATTHEW GODFREY,
Defendants/Appellees.

APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through counsel, the Utah Legal
Clinic submits the following BRIEF OF APPELLANT:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as
amended). The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953 as amended).
The Rule 11 sanctions judgment and order (R. 763), tne subject matter of this
appeal, was entered on July 29, 2008. The Notice of Appeal was filed on August 19,
2008. R. 778.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER
RULE 11, UT.R.CIV.PRO. WITHOUT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
THE PROCEDURES OF THAT RULE?
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER
RULE 11, UT.R.CIV.PRO. WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS?
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER
RULE 11, UT.R.CIV.PRO. WITHOUT ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF
FACTS?
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER
RULE 11, UT.R.CIV.PRO. BASED ON ITS PREVIOUS ERRONEOUS
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended)?
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) WITHOUT
ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO RESPOND TO THE MOTION?
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) WITHOUT ADEQUATE
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND WITHOUT ADEQUATE FACTS TO
SUPPORT THE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS?

2

ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED
The issues on appeal were raised in three (3) motions and supporting memorandums, to wit: Motion to Dismiss (R.l 13-116; 120-156), Motion for Attorney fees
under Ut. Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1953 as amended) (R. 117-156) and Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions. R. 631-651. Plaintiffs' and appellant's response memorandums countered the
several motions of the defendants. R. 232; 283; 286; 473; 559; 673. Defendants'
motions were considered and resolved in the Court's Memorandum Decisions (R. 619623; 748-754) and Orders. R. 658-666; 763-770.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953 as amendedV
An award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 7$-27-56 (1953 as amended),
against a party whose action is without merit and is brought in bad faith is reviewed on
appeal as a mixed question of fact and law: "As to whether the party lacked good faith,
the trial court must make a factual finding of a party's subjective intent. In addition, the
trial court must conclude, as a matter of law, that the action was without merit." Burton
Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, f 11, 186 P.3d 1012 quoting
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998).
The trial court's determination that [a] claim was filed in bad faith is a
question of fact that we review under a "clearly erroneous" standard.

1

The statute has been re-numbered; it is now Ut. Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (2008).
A copy of the statute is attached to this brief.
3

Hopkins v. Hales. 2008 UT App 95, ^ 7, 185 P.3d 402 citing Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d
202, 204 (Ut. Ct.App.1991); Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, lj 6, 178 P.3d 922.
"CA finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.'" State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)
(auotinz United States v. U.S. Gvpsum Co.. 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948)).
"A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and are not given
special deference." Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co.. 787 P.2d 1, 2 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990)
(citing Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); Western Kane County Special
Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987)).
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure2
Appellate review of sanctions under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires different standards depending on the issue considered:
•

the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard;

•

the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Rule 11 was violated and any
subsidiary legal conclusions are reviewed under a correction of error
standard; and,
the trial court's determination as to the type and amount of sanctions to be
imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

K.F.K. v. T.W.. 2005 UT App 85, f 4; 110 P.3d 162; Morse v. Packer. 2000 UT 86, If 16,

2

A copy of the pertinent portions of Rule 11 is attached to this brief.
4

15 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Utah 2000) citing Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, If 10; 973 P.2d 422
(citing Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1992)); Pennington v. Allstate Ins.
Co.. 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998).
Interpretation of and compliance with the procedural requirements of Rule 11 are
reviewed as a matter of law under a correction of error standard. See MacFarlane v. State
Tax Comm'n. 2006 UT 25, f 9, 134 P.3d 1116.

STATEMENT OF THE CASK
Sixty-two (62) Ogden City voters brought suit under the Utah Declaratory
Judgment Act seeking construction and, if appropriate, enforcement of certain Ogden
City Ordinances regarding elections. Suit was filed a month before the November 2007
municipal election and dealt with personal campaign committees, the vehicles through
which all city election campaigns must be conducted. Appellant Brian M. Barnard
("Barnard") represented plaintiffs in that action.
Defendants were the City Attorney and City Recorder (the "City Defendants") and
the incumbent Mayor, who was then a mayoral candidate. The suit complained that the
Mayor had failed to properly register his personal campaign committee and had failed to
file required financial reports for that committee.
Plaintiffs sought equitable relief. R. 1-44. Plaintiffs were granted declaratory
relief- the trial Court reviewed and interpreted certain Ogden election code ordinances.
R. 619-623; 658-666. Plaintiffs were denied injunctive relief- the trial Court's
interpretation of the ordinances differed from plaintiffs' proposed interpretation. Id.
5

The plaintiffs take an active interest in Ogden municipal government and speak out
on matters of concern to city residents. R. 322-470. Plaintiffs brought suit in good faith,
motivated by a sincere belief that defendant Matthew Godfrey had failed to comply with
Ogden City election code requirements and that two (2) members of Godfrey's city
administration had failed to take appropriate action to secure compliance. Id.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. R. 113-116; 120-156. Before the
trial court's determination as to any substantive claims, defendants moved for an award of
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended), alleging
plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought in bad faith and was without merit. R. 117-119; 120-156.
At an October 23, 2007 hearing, the trial court orally ruled dismissing the case and
awarding attorney fees to defendants. The court did not allow an opportunity for
plaintiffs to respond to the motion for attorney fees. R. 802, Transcript, p. 19-20; 23-24.
Plaintiffs' uncontroverted affidavits address the elements necessary for an award
of fees under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). The trial court disregarded
that evidence and reaffirmed its precipitous ruling awarding fees to defendants. Judgment
was granted against plaintiffs for approximately fifteen thousand dollars (-$15,000.00) in
attorney fees pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended).3 R. 619; 658.

3

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) is narrowly drawn and "not meant
to be applied to all prevailing parties in all civil suits." In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^
46, 86 P.3d 712; Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen. 2005 UT 46,1f 9,122 P.3d 556;
Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
. . . We remind trial courts that the "reason for awarding attorney
fees [based on bad faith] is to punish the wrongdoer, and not compensate
the victim," and that fees should therefore be awarded only upon specific
6

That sum represented one-half (-Vz) of the fees claimed by defendants. Those judgments
have been satisfied. Those judgments have not been appealed. Those erroneous earlier
determinations, in large part, form the basis for the Rule 11 sanctions which are the
subject matter of this appeal. R. 749; 750, ftnote 2; 763.
After fees were awarded under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended), the
City Defendants moved for sanctions personally against plaintiffs' counsel, Brian M.
Barnard pursuant to Rule 11. R. 631 -651. That motion did riot comply with the clear and
specific requirements of Rule 11.
Barnard submitted an uncontroverted affidavit addressing the issues raised in the
Rule 11 motion. R. 687-690. Specifically he stated that he had researched Utah law with
regard to declaratory judgments and that the complaint seeking declaratory relief was
appropriate and clearly authorized by law. Secondly, he stated that the interpretation of
the city ordinances which plaintiffs proposed was "warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law." Ut.R.Civ.Pro. 11.
Relying exclusively on its earlier improper ruling under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56
(1953 as amended) against the plaintiffs, the court below awarded attorney fees against
plaintiffs' counsel. Despite fatal procedural defects in the motion and a lack of
supporting facts, the trial court awarded a judgment against Barnard personally for the

evidence of bad faith.
Still Standing at f 16.
7

sum often thousand dollars ($10,000.00) pursuant to Rule 11. Ignoring the specific
procedural requirements of Rule 11, with little discussion or analysis, the trial court
erroneously held that "substantial compliance" with that rule was sufficient. R. 750-753;
764-766.
This timely appeal (R.778) followed the award of attorney fees under Rule 11.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

Sixty-two (62) voters of Ogden City on October 1, 2007 sued seeking a

declaratory judgment, equitable relief and an extraordinary writ. R. 1-44.
2.

The complaint was clear: "Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a

determination regarding defendants' obligations under Ogden Municipal Code with
regard to financial disclosures for candidates and personal campaign committees for
candidates for municipal offices." R. 2, ^[ 1; R. 3, Tf 9.
3.

The defendant City Recorder Cindi Mansell ("Mansell") and the defendant

City Attorney Gary Williams ("Williams") filed a motion to dismiss, (R.l 13-116) a
motion for expedited briefing and hearing, (R.l04-112) and a motion for an award of
attorney fees on October 11, 2007. R. 117-119; 120-156.
4.

Defendants lodged an over length memorandum in support of those three

(3) motions. R. 120-156. Defendants sought leave to file their over length memorandum
outside the rules. R. 100-103; Ut.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 7(c)(2) (ten page limit absent leave of
court). Leave was never formally granted. See Exhibit "E" attached, Electronic Docket.
8

5.

The motion of Defendants for expedited briefing and hearing was never

formally granted. See Court Docket, Exhibit "E" attached.
6.

Plaintiffs responded to defendants' motion to dismiss and opposed the

motion for expedited briefing on October 22, 2007. R. 232-285; Exhibit "G" attached.
7.

A hearing was set on October 23, 2007 on motions to dismiss and plaintiffs'

motion for immediate relief. October 10, 2007 Minute Entry in the electronic docket (p.
7) attached as Exhibit "E." A copy of the actual notice generated by the court for said
hearing is attached as Exhibit "F." R. 92. Neither the docket nor the notice of hearing
show that the Motion for Attorney Fees was to be heard.
8.

Plaintiffs formally informed the Court that they would oppose defendants'

motion for attorney fees. Exhibit "H" attached; R. 286-287. The deadline to respond to
that fee motion (October 25, 2007, Ut.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 7) wap after the hearing set on the
defendants' motion to dismiss. Id.
9.

At the hearing of October 23, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel objected to

consideration of the motion for an award of attorney fees because, inter alia, (a) the
motion had not been set for hearing, (b) plaintiffs had not yet filed a response to that
motion, (c) no order had been entered granting expedited briefing or hearing on the
motion, and, (d) the time for plaintiffs to respond to the motion had not yet expired. R.
802; Transcript 19-20; 23-24 (pertinent excerpts of transcript attached to this brief).
10.

Over the objections of plaintiffs' counsel, the Court heard, considered and

granted defendants' motion for an award of attorney fees. R 802; Transcript 19-20.
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11.

On November 23, 2007, twenty-one (21) affidavits by named plaintiffs

were filed setting out their goals, purposes and good faith in filing this action. R. 322470. The trial court gave no weight to and/or disregarded those affidavits. R. 802.4
12.

On December 3, 2007, plaintiffs filed a memo opposing defendants' motion

for attorney fees. R. 473-497. The trial court disregarded that memo. R. 802.4
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF OGDEN CITY MUNICIPAL CODE.
13.

All candidates for Ogden City offices must comply with the campaign

finance disclosure requirements of Ogden City Municipal Code §§ 1-8-1 et seq. R. 5.
Copies of the pertinent portions of the city election code are attached to plaintiffs'
complaint as an Exhibit. R. 15, et seq.
14.

All election campaign activities must be conducted through an entity called

a "personal campaign committee." Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-2(A).
15.

Subsection l-8-2(D) requires that candidates register their personal

campaign committee with the City Recorder.

4

. . . The Court has already rejected plaintiffs5 interpretation of the City ordinance and their position in the
litigation and has already determined that plaintiffs' lawsuit
was brought without merit and in bad faith. The only issue
remaining before the Court is the amount of attorney's fees
and costs, if any, to be awarded to the defendants.
*

*

*

. . . Rather than address the present issue, the affidavit[s of plaintiffs] essentially restate[] the conclusions that
are totally inconsistent with the prior rulings of this court.
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 2, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 620.
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16.

Subsection l-8-4(B) requires that candidates arid/or personal campaign

committees file financial statements on various dates.
17.

Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-5(A) provides:

. . . If it appears that any candidate or personal campaign committee has failed to
file a statement as required by law or if it appears that the statement does not
conform to law or upon complaint in writing by a candidate or by a voter that a
statement filed does not conform to law, the City Recorder shall notify the
delinquent personal campaign committee or candidate, in writing, requesting
compliance with this Chapter.
18.

The City Recorder must inspect the books of a personal campaign

committee upon the failure of the candidate or committee to file a financial statement
after notice under Subsection l-8-5(A). Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-5(B).
19.

Subsection l-8-5(D) provides a private right olfaction to registered voters

such as the plaintiffs. It provides:
In the event the City Recorder of the City Attorney refuses to take the actions
provided by this Section, any registered voter in the City may institute appropriate
proceedings for an extraordinary writ.
Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-5(D).
20.

Subsection l-8-6(A) addresses the consequences of a candidate's failure to

file the required financial statements. It provides:
The name of a candidate shall not be printed on, or if already printed shall be
removed from, the official ballot for the ensuing election unless the statements of
contributions and expenditures relating to the candidate have been filed by the
candidate of the candidate's personal committee as required by this Chapter.
Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-6(A).
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APPLICATION OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
21.

As a mayoral candidate in the November 2007 election, Matthew Godfrey

was subject to the Ogden City Municipal Code §§ 1-8-1 et seq. R. 5, ^ 17-18.
22.

Godfrey operated a "personal campaign committee" as defined in Ogden

City Municipal Code § 1-8-1. R. 6, ^ 27.
23.

Godfrey's "personal campaign committee" used the name "People to

Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey." R. 6, \ 28.
24.

Godfrey never registered the name of his personal campaign committee

"People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey" with the Ogden City Recorder. R. 7, f 31.
25.

On September 13, 2007, plaintiff Dorothy Littrell ("Littrell") complained to

Mansell that Godfrey failed to register "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey" with the
Ogden City Recorder. R. 7,fflf3 2 - 3 3 .
26.

On September 17, 2007 Mansell notified Godfrey that a complaint had been

made that he had not registered "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey." R. 7, ^f 34.
27.

Godfrey claimed he was not required to register "People to Re-Elect

Matthew Godfrey" with the City Recorder. R. 8, \ 35.
28.

Godfrey claimed he was not required to file financial statements in the

name of "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey" with the City Recorder. R. 8, ^ 36.
29.

Littrell demanded that Mansell require Godfrey to produce and that Mansell

examine all records of "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey" under Ogden Municipal
Code§ l-8-5(B). R. 9, If 41.
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30.

Mansell did not examine the records of "People to Re-Elect Matthew

Godfrey" under Ogden Municipal Code § l-8-5(B). R. 8, t 3J8.
PLAINTIFFS' GOALS, PURPOSES and GOOD FAITH
31.

The plaintiffs are interested in Ogden municipal government. They are

active as to matters of concern to residents of Ogden City. They participate in the local
political process. Aff of Rodriguez, ^ 4, R. 323; Plaintiffs' Affidavits, 14; 5 R. 322-470.
32.

Plaintiffs participated in this lawsuit because of the importance of the issues

raised and because of concern for the integrity of the election process in Ogden.
Plaintiffs' Aff s. f 5.
33.

Plaintiffs sought interpretation of the ordinances and how they apply (or do

not apply) to the situation presented by Godfrey. R. 1-44; Plaintiffs' Aff s. 1 6.
34.

This lawsuit sought remedies as provided by the Ogden election code. The

lawsuit sought no monetary damages. Plaintiffs' Aff s. % 7.
35.

On November 6, 2007 the pertinent election was held. Plaintiffs' Aff s. f 8.

36.

While many plaintiffs are not supporters of Matthew Godfrey, they bear no

5

Plaintiffs Dorothy E. Littrell, R. 399, James R. Briley, R. 364, Rulon Yorgason,
R. 443, Charles L. Magruder, R. 457, Lily Magruder, R. 429, Cristina H. Rodriguez, R.
332, Saul R. Aguilar, R. 336, Milton Rodriguez, R. 415, Rebecca P. Hernandez, R. 329,
Ramon Aguilar, R. 343, Raymond D. Anderson, R. 371, Senorina D. Fernandez, R. 464,
Epifano Gallegos, R. 422, Basil Beech, R. 357, Sharon Beech, R. 408, Katie Spendlove,
R. 350, Jason Rusch, R. 392, David L. Rusch, R. 378, Cynthia Rusch, R. 385, Lavere W.
Rawlins, R. 436, and F. Craig Hazen, R. 450, each filed similar affidavits setting forth
their motivation and good faith in filing this action. These uncontroverted affidavits were
filed on November 23, 2007. R. 322-470. Citations to "Plaintiffs' Aff s." are collectively
to each and all of those affidavits which generally contain similarly numbered paragraphs.
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malice nor ill will toward him. They believed, as the incumbent Mayor, Godfrey had a
special obligation to comply with Ogden City Ordinances. As Mayor, he should have full
accountability with the city's election laws and should be held to high standards.
Plaintiffs' AfFs. 19.
37.

Plaintiffs bear no malice or ill will toward the City Defendants. Plaintiffs'

Affs.^f 10.
38.

The plaintiffs reviewed the Ogden City election laws upon which suit was

based. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^f 11. From their reading of those election laws, they believed
that all city candidates should register the actual name of his/her personal campaign
committee with the City Recorder. It made no sense to plaintiffs, for a candidate to
simply tell the City Recorder that a personal campaign committee has been formed but
not to divulge the committee's name. A candidate is to use only one campaign committee
and failure to register the name of that one committee might lead to violations and
problems. Plaintiffs' Aff s. 1f 12.
39.

Plaintiffs understood the purpose for the registration of personal campaign

committees was to publicly disclose what entity was accountable for campaigning and
soliciting donations for a candidate. Accountability is not possible, or is severely
hampered, if the actual name of the campaign committee is not divulged and registered.
Plaintiffs'Aff s.TJ 13.
40.

Several different Ogden City elective offices were on the ballot for the

November 6th election. Plaintiffs' desire was that all candidates fully comply with the city
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election laws. Plaintiffs' Aff s. f 14.
41.

Plaintiffs understood that a lawsuit could be brought only after Mansell or

Williams received a complaint and failed to act. Plaintiffs' Aff s. 121. Plaintiffs are not
aware of complaints made as to candidates other than Godfrey. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^j 16.
42.

Plaintiff Littrell complained to Mansell and Williams that Godfrey had

violated the election laws. Based upon that complaint, Mansell and Williams were to take
certain action. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^ 18. Until a suspected violation is brought to the
attention of Mansell and Williams, they are not required to act. Plaintiffs' Aff s. Tf 19.
43.

If a violation of the election law occurs, sanctions are provided for by

Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-6. Those potential sanctions include removal of the
candidate's name from the ballot. A candidate might be able to quickly remedy the
violation and remain on the ballot. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^f 20.
44.

For effective sanctions, this lawsuit had to be resolved before the November

6th election. Corrective actions by Godfrey (or other candidates) had to occur before the
election. Plaintiffs' Aff s. 122.
45.

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment by a judge (and not by an

appointed city official in the Mayor's administration, e.g., defendant Williams)
interpreting and, if appropriate, applying the Ogden election ordinances. Plaintiffs' Aff s.
Tf 23. They wanted the matter judicially considered before the November 6th election.
Plaintiffs' Aff s. 124.
46.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit because they believed that Mansell and Williams

15

failed to perform acts required under the ordinances. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^ 25.
47.

Filing this lawsuit, plaintiffs believed that Godfrey had failed to comply

with the city election laws. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^f 26. They believed that this lawsuit was a
proper and valid method to seek an interpretation of and, if appropriate, to apply the
Ogden City election laws. Plaintiffs' Aff s. f 2 7 .
48.

Plaintiffs did not intend in any way to improperly impose upon or take

advantage of any person by filing this lawsuit. Plaintiffs' Aff s. lj 28.
49.

Plaintiffs' goal in this lawsuit was not in any way to improperly hinder or

delay the campaign or election process. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^ 29.
50.

Plaintiffs were granted declaratory relief. As requested, the Court reviewed

and interpreted certain election code ordinances. R. 619-623. Plaintiffs were denied
injunctive relief in that the Court's interpretation of the ordinances differed from
plaintiffs'proposed interpretation. R. 620.
51.

Plaintiffs' counsel researched the law with regard to declaratory judgments

prior to the filing suit. R. 687-690. That research is reflected in the memoranda of law
filed in this action. R. 232-282; 291-302; 473-497; 559-598.
52.

Plaintiffs' counsel determined that under Utah law, concerned voters had

the right to seek a judicial determination as to city ordinances regarding municipal
elections and campaigns. R. 687-690.
53.

As detailed in their memorandums, plaintiffs believed that the interpretation

by defendants renders several sections of Ogden City municipal code meaningless. R.
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232-282; 291-302; 473-497; 559-598. Plaintiffs advocated aifr interpretation to prevent
the code sections from being rendered meaningless. Id
54.

Plaintiffs and counsel believed their arguments and proposed interpretation

had a reasonable basis in Utah law. Id. Utah courts have oftin rejected statutory
interpretations which render a statute useless and of no material benefit. Id.
55.

On October 11, 2007, counsel for the City Defendants sent a "warning

letter" stating that defendants would seek Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel if
the complaint was not voluntarily withdrawn. Exhibit "I" attached. The defendants
stated they would not seek Rule 11 sanctions for twenty-one (21) days. Id.
56.

No motion nor supporting memorandum under!Rule 11 was prepared or

served at that time by counsel for the City Defendants. See id.; R. 750-751.
57.

Less than twenty-one (<21) days after the wanting letter, on October 23,

2007, the trial court orally dismissed the complaint. R. 802, Transcript, p. 19-20; 23-24.
58.

Five (5) months later, the City Defendants prepared, filed and served a

motion for sanctions under Rule 11 with a supporting memorandum. R. 631; 649.
Plaintiffs' counsel opposed that motion. R. 673; 687.
59.

The trial court granted sanctions personally against plaintiffs' counsel

awarding a judgment of $10,000.00 in favor of the City Defendants. R. 748 (Exhibit "C"
attached); R. 763 (Exhibit "D" attached).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants did not comply with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendants' "warning letter" was not a motion as required. Plaintiffs were
not afforded the mandatory safe harbor. A Rule 11 motion was served on March 28,
2008, over five (5+) months after the oral dismissal of the complaint. Rule 11 motions
filed after a dismissal of the underlying case must be denied.
The trial court based its award of fees under Rule 11 upon its earlier erroneous
award under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). The earlier improper award
could not support the later Rule 11 award.
No facts support the Rule 11 sanctions. No findings of fact made by the trial court
support the Rule 11 sanctions.
Findings of fact are required to support fee awards under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2756 (1953 as amended). The court below failed to make independent findings or made
such findings based on insufficient facts.
This action was brought in good faith and sought the relief provided by Utah
Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs should be assessed attorney fees even though the
trial court rejected plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of the ordinances at issue.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) authorizes an award of attorney
fees only upon a finding that the suit (a) was frivolous and (b) was not brought in good
faith. In this case, both elements are lacking. Plaintiffs reasonably argued defendants'
interpretation of the relevant sections of Ogden City election code is legally flawed
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because it renders ordinances meaningless and of no effect. Plaintiffs acted in the public
interest and in good faith. Defendants fail to meet their burden to show bad faith.
The trial court did not allow plaintiffs to respond to the attorney fees motion
precipitously granting it over objections of plaintiffs' counsel and without due process.

ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) allowfe an award of attorney fees
"only if the trial court determines that the claim . . . asserted , .. was meritless; and that
claim . . . was asserted in bad faith." Chipman v. Miller. 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1997).6 The facts of this case and the applicable law do not support a finding of
meritlessness nor bad faith. The trial court's erroneous fee aWard under Ut. Code Ann.
§78-27-56 (1953 as amended) served as the foundation for the court's subsequent
imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 against counsel.
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows sanctions if a pleading is presented
to a court by an attorney (i) who has not made an inquiry rea$onable under the circumstances to determine whether the pleading makes claims warranted by existing law or by a
non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law, or, (ii) if the pleading is presented for an improper purpose

6

"Meritless" as used in the statute is not simply losing a claim. A claim is
"without merit," if the claim is frivolous, is of little weight or importance having no basis
in law or fact, or clearly lacks a legal basis for recovery. Wardley Better Homes and
Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ^ 30, 61 P.3d 1009 rehearing denied. Meritlessness is
not determined in hindsight merely because the party's claim was not successful.
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(such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation).
Specific procedures are set out in Rule 11 for a motion seeking sanctions. The
City Defendants did not follow those procedures. The trial court erroneously found that
"substantial compliance" with those procedures was sufficient.
The facts of this case and the applicable law do not support the findings required
for sanctions under Rule 11.

I.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11
The overwhelming majority of reported decisions considering sanctions under

Rule 11 require strict compliance with its specific requirements, to-wit: a written motion
and supporting memorandum served twenty-one (21) days prior to their being filed with
the court so as to allow opposing counsel to withdraw an allegedly offending pleading or
paper. The City Defendants failed to comply with those provisions. The trial court
disregarded the non-compliance and erroneously awarded sanctions under Rule 11.
No reported Utah cases have ruled on the Rule 11 procedures involved in this case,
however a number of federal case have done so. "Utah's rule 11 was patterned after the
federal rule 11 promulgated in 1983." Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977
P.2d 462, 464-465 (Utah \99S)( citing Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah
1992)). The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that federal authority addressing the
application of federal Rule 11 is "helpful to our understanding the [state] rule." Morse v.
Packer, 2000 UT 86, 15 P.3d 1021, 1028 (Utah 2000); see also Kaiserman Associates,
Inc. v. Francis Town. 15 P.3d 1021, 1028 (Utah 2000); Barnard. 846 P.2d at 1223.
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Courts applying federal Rule 11 have consistently required strict compliance with
its procedural mandates noting that "[i]t is clear from the language [of the rule] that it
imposes mandatory obligations upon the party seeking sanctions, so that failure to comply
with the procedural requirements precludes the imposition of the requested sanctions."
Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng.. Inc.. 369 F.3d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 2004).
The majority rule as to Rule 11 requires a formal motion and supporting
memorandum to be formally served and the full safe harbor period to be afforded to the
non-moving party. Ridder v. City of Springfield. 109 F.3d 288, 297 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that "sanctions under Rule 11 are unavailable unless the motion for sanctions is
served on the opposing party for the full twenty-one day 'safe harbor5 period before it is
filed with or presented to the court"); Carruthers v. Flaum. 450 F. Supp. 2d 288, 306
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The law in this Circuit is clear: the only way to start the 21 day clock
running is for a party seeking sanctions to serve a fully supported motion."); Gal v.
Viacom Inf 1. Inc.. 403 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[T]he plain language of
the rule states explicitly that service of the motion itself is required to begin the safe
harbor clock — the rule says nothing about the use of letters."); Radcliffe v. Rainbow
Constr. Co.. 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[Although % defendant had given
informal warnings to the plaintiffs threatening to seek Rule 1|1 sanctions, these warnings
did not satisfy the strict requirement that a motion be served on the opposing party
twenty-one days prior to filing."); Barber v. Miller. 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) ("It
would therefore wrench both the language and purpose of the amendment to the Rule to
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permit an informal warning to substitute for service of a motion.").
In Roth v. Green, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that warning
letters sent to the respondent in advance of filing were insufficient to comply with the
service requirement. 466 F.3d 1179, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2006). After analyzing the
language of Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee Notes, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
"warning letters, such as those sent by defendants to [counsel], are supplemental to, and
cannot be deemed an adequate substitute for, the service of the motion itself." Id. at
1192. The court went on to state:
The reason for requiring a copy of the motion itself, rather than simply a
warning letter, to be served on the allegedly offending party is clear. The
safe harbor provisions were intended to "protect[] litigants from sanctions
whenever possible in order to mitigate Rule 1 lfs chilling effects, formaliz[e]
procedural due process considerations such as notice for the protection of
the party accused of sanctionable behavior, and encourag[e] the withdrawal
of papers that violate the rule without involving the district court." Thus, "a
failure to comply with them [should] result in the rejection of the motion for
sanctions."
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1337.2, at 722-23 (3d ed. 2004)). In addition to the Tenth, the
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all taken a similar approach to interpreting
the requirements of Rule 11. In re: Jack E. Pratt. Jr.. Debtor. Cadle v. Pratt. 524 F.3d
580, 588 (5th Cir. 2008) ("we have continually held that strict compliance with Rule 11 is
mandatory. We may not disregard the plain language of the statute and our prior
precedent without evidence of congressional intent to allow 'substantial compliance'
through informal service"); Brickwood Contractors. Inc. v. Datanet Eng'g. Inc.. 369 F.3d
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385, 389 (4th Cir. 2004); Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co.. 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir.
2001) ("[T]he fact that the plaintiffs had advance warning th^t Rainbow objected to their
conspiracy allegation did not cure Rainbow's failure to comply with the strict procedural
requirement of Rule 11(c)(1)(A)."); see also Gordon v. Unifund CCR Partners. 345 F.3d
1028, 1030 (8th Cir. 2003) (denying Rule 11 sanctions because the defendant sent
informal letters to the plaintiff instead of a copy of the motion for sanctions).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated:
Compliance with the service requirement is a mandatory prerequisite to an
award of sanctions under Rule 11. "[S]uch service [is required] to give the
parties at whom the motion is directed an opportunity to withdraw or
correct the offending contention." [See Elliott v. Tilton. 64 F.3d 213, 216
(5th Cir. 1995)]. Although we have not directly addressed whether informal
notice is sufficient, several other circuits have addressed the issue in the
context of Rule 11 and determined that it is insufficient to comply with the
text and spirit of the Rule.
In re: Jack E. Pratt Jr., Debtor. Cadle v. Pratt. 524 F.3d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 2008) (ftnotes
omitted).
Strict compliance with procedures is required to impose sanctions under Rule 11.
Cases Cited by Trial Court Re: Disregard of Rule 11 Procedures
The trial court cited only two (2) cases in support of its decision to disregard the
procedural requirement of Rule 11. R. 751, p. 4, Exhibit "C" attached. Those cases are
inapposite and/or represent a minority application of Rule 111.
Methode Electronics. Inc. v. Adam Technologies. Inc.. 371 F. 3d 923 (7th Cir.
2004) was not resolved under Rule 11(b) on a request initiated by a party. The trial judge
issued an order to show cause why the plaintiffs should not be sanctioned under Rule 11.
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Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The court initiated order to show cause
remained pending. The trial judge concluded that plaintiff had no evidentiary basis for
the venue alleged in the complaint and that the conduct was "intentionally deceptive"
toward the court. Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the trial judge imposed sanctions of
$10,000.00 payable to the court, and a portion defendant's attorneys fees.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the award was sustainable as an
imposition of sanctions within the court's inherent power and not under Rule 11.
Methode at 926 (7th Cir. 2004). The court specifically declined to decide whether Rule 11
sanctions were appropriate despite non-compliance with Rule 11. Id at 927. The
Methode court did not uphold counsel initiated sanctions under Rule 11.
Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2003) is not followed by
other courts and is contrary to the consistent majority interpretation of Rule 11. The
Seventh Circuit awarded sanctions under Rule 11 even though the defendant had sent the
respondent only a "letter" and not a copy of a motion for sanctions. In reaching its
conclusion, the Seventh Circuit did not address the language of Rule 11, the Advisory
Committee Notes to the Rule, or any other Rule 11 jurisprudence. The court
simply stated that the "[defendants have complied substantially with Rule 11(c)(1)(A)
and are entitled to a decision on the merits of their request for sanctions under Rule 11."
Id. Because the Seventh Circuit provided little analysis and cited no authority, the
propriety of its holding has been called into doubt. See Roth, 466 F.3d at 1193 ("We find
[Nisenbaum] unpersuasive, however, because it contains no analysis of the language of
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Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or the Advisory Committee Notes, cites to no authority for its holding,
and indeed is the only published circuit decision reaching sudh a conclusion.")We are not persuaded that informal service is sufficient to satisfy the
service requirement of Rule 9011 .[7] Contrary to the holding in Nisenbaum,
the plain language of [Bankruptcy] Rule 9011 mandates that the movant
serve the respondent with a copy of the motion before filing it with the
court. There is no indication in Rule 9011 (or Rule 11) or in the advisory
notes to support [appellant's] contention that a motion for sanctions may be
filed with the court without serving the respondent with a copy at least
twenty-one days in advance.
In re: Jack E. Pratt, Jr.. Debtor. Cadle v. Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 588 (5th Cir. 2008).

II.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11 NOT FOLLOWED
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) specifies certain procedural requirements
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall. . . describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.

Utah R. Civ. Pro. 11(c)(1)(A).
Rule 11 requires service a motion and a supporting memorandum and requires that
the other party be allowed 21 days to withdraw the challenged paper. Neither requirement was fulfilled in the case at bar.

7

Federal Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is substantially identical to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, therefore, the court referred to Rule 11 jurisprudence when considering
sanctions under Rule 9011. In re: Jack E. Pratt. Jr.. Debtor, Cadle v. Pratt. 524 F.3d 580,
586 (5th Cir. 2008).
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A.

October 11, 2007 Warning Letter was Not Required Motion.
The City Defendants' "warning letter" was dated October 11, 2007. Exhibit "I"

attached. The letter says a Rule 11 motion will be filed z/the complaint is not withdrawn.
("We will hold off filing a formal Rule 11 motion until expiration of the 21 days safe
harbor deadline. If the Complaint has not been voluntarily withdrawn before then, we
will proceed to file our Rule 11 motion." Id.). The letter recites a future intent.8
That "warning letter" does not contain any legal or factual argument related to
Rule 11. Rather than legal analysis found in a supporting legal memorandum, the
"warning letter" is merely a strong demand letter.
Rule 11 requires a written motion and a supporting memorandum. Rule 7(c)(1),
Ut.R.Civ.Pro. The City Defendants never timely prepared nor served a motion. No
supporting memorandum accompanied the "warning letter."
B.

Required Twenty-one (21) Days Safe Harbor.
Assuming the City Defendants' warning letter complied with the requirements of

Rule 11, plaintiffs and counsel had until November 5, 2007 to withdraw the complaint.
The Court held an expedited hearing on October 23, 2007 and dismissed the
Complaint. That dismissal, prior to the expiration of the safe harbor time limit, precluded

8

Separate from the procedural requirements of Rule 11, the "warning letter"
clearly states the City Defendants will not file a Rule 11 motion for twenty-one (21) days.
Plaintiffs and their counsel reasonably relied on that representation as to whether and
when the City Defendants would act under Rule 11.
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plaintiffs from withdrawing the complaint. Counsel can notfyesanctioned under Rule 11
when the challenged pleading was dismissed within the twenty-one (21) days period.
Rule 11 "imposes mandatory obligations upon the pariy seeking sanctions, so that
failure to comply with the procedural requirements precludes the imposition of the
requested sanctions." Brickwood Contractors. Inc. v. Datanet Engineering. Inc.. 369 F.3d
385, 389 (4th Cir. 2004); Roth v. Green. 466 F.3d 1179, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2006); Gordon
v.UnifundCCR Partners. 345 F.3d 1028, 1030 (8th Cir.2003); Radcliffe v. Rainbow
Constr. Co.. 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir.2001); AeroTech. Inc. v. Estes. 110 F.3d 1523,
1528-29 (10th Cir.1997); Ridder v. City of Springfield. 109 F.3d 288, 296 (6th Cir. 1997);
Elliott v. Tilton. 64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1995); Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp.. 48
F.3d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir.1995). Rule 11 is intended "to give the parties at whom the
motion is directed an opportunity to withdraw or correct the offending contention."
Aerojech, 110 F.3d at 1528-29.
The trial court erroneously found the letter sent by counsel for Mansell and
Williams "substantially complies with the requirements of Rule 11" and that the 12 days
afforded plaintiffs' counsel prior to the October 23, 2007 hearing "was enough time for
[plaintiffs' counsel] to consider the possibility of sanctions[.]" R. 751. The court below
also erroneously concluded that the "reason more time was riot allowed to pass was
because Plaintiffs requested an expedited hearing" and they "can not now use the
expedited hearing timetable that [they] requested as a shield against Rule 11 sanctions."
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R. 752.9 Plaintiffs never requested an expedited hearing on any of Defendants' motions.
The court awarded sanctions despite the lack of compliance with the safe harbor
requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(A).
C.

Rule 11 Motion Filed after the Case is Dismissed
The Court orally dismissed plaintiffs' complaint at the close of the hearing of

October 23rd. R. 802, Transcript, 31-37. More than five (5+) months later, the City
Defendants prepared and filed a Rule 11 motion. R. 631; R. 649. A Rule 11 motion
served and filed after the underlying case has been dismissed must be denied. The reason
is the opposing party no longer has the power or ability to withdraw or correct the
challenged pleading. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000);
Ridder. 109 F.3d at 294-95, 297; Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir.1998).

III.

NO FACTS SUPPORT FINDING A VIOLATION OF RULE 11
Rule 11(b), Ut.R.Civ.Pro. requires an attorney to certify that "to the best of [his /

her] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances" a pleading presented to a court
•

is not presented for an improper purpose (such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation), and

•

makes claims warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
9

While plaintiffs requested a hearing on their motion for immediate injunctive
relief, plaintiff did not request an expedited hearing on the motion to dismiss nor on the
motion for attorney fees. No order for or notice of an expedited hearing on the fee motion
was ever made. See Exhibit "E" attached.
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law.
In this case, the trial court made no finding and included no discussion in its ruling
and order as to the propriety of plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs'
counsel submitted an uncontroverted affidavit (R. 687-690) that he researched the law
with regard to declaratory judgments and determined that plaintiffs had the right to file
such an action as to the ordinances at issue. IdL referencing memorandums filed herein R.
232-282; 291-302; 473-497; 559-598. Filing such an action under the Utah Declaratory
Judgment Act and simply asking for an interpretation of certain city ordinances can not be
in violation of Rule 11.
In addition to asking for a judicial interpretation of the city's election ordinances,
plaintiffs proposed their own interpretation of the ordinances. Plaintiffs reasonably
suggested what they believed the ordinances meant and how they should be interpreted
and applied. R. 1-44 (complaint); R. 322-470 (affidavits); R, 232-282; 291-302; 473-497;
559-598 (memorandums). Rule 11 is not violated if the attoitneyfs reading of the law is
reasonable. After conducting appropriate research, the mere fact that attorney's view of
the law was wrong cannot support finding of a Rule 11 violation. Plaintiffs' counsel's
arguments and interpretation were objectively reasonable wfyen compared to existing law.
Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1992).
Rule 11 does not impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive legal research; the
appropriate standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable under all the
circumstances. Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213, ^ 8; 16? P.3d 747, rehearing denied,
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cert, denied 186 P.3d 957; Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1992). The
research and the conclusion reached by plaintiffs' counsel were objectively reasonable.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT MADE INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO SUPPORT
ATTORNEY FEES AWARDS.
The court below failed to make independent bad faith findings or made such

findings based on insufficient facts. Under Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953 as
amended) and under Rule 11, the trial court must make adequate and specific factual
findings. Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78, ]f 10, 985 P.2d 255, 258-259 (detailed findings
required to impose Rule 11 sanctions). Detailed findings are required under Ut. Code
Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended), especially when facts are in dispute or ambiguous.
In re Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, Tf 52, 86 P.3d 712 quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774
at 788 (Utah 1991) ("while the district court's failure to enter a specific finding . . . alone
does not warrant reversal, we cannot uphold its finding where 'the ambiguity of the facts
makes [an assumption of bad faith] unreasonable'."); Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App
40, Tf 15, 178 P.3d 922 (citing Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1983)).
Specific findings are required to support a conclusion of meritlessness and bad
faith.
"In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.]" Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1)
(2002). The plain language of the statute details three (3) requirements that must
be met before fees are awarded: " \\) the party must prevail, (2) the claim
asserted by the opposing party must be without merit, and (3) the claim must not
be brought or asserted in good faith.5"
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Gallegos v. Llovd. 2008 UT App 40, If 9, 178 P.3d 922 (citations omitted).
A.

Findings as per Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
The trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support imposition of Rule 11

sanctions. There were insufficient facts before the trial court for it to make the necessary
findings.10 The Rule 11 memorandum decision (R. 748) and the order based thereon (R.
763) are respectively Exhibits "C" and "D" attached.
The factual findings11 to purportedly support the Rule 11 sanctions fee award
against counsel for plaintiffs are:
. . . On or about October 11, 2007, counsel for the Ogden City
Defendants sent Mr. Barnard a letter advising him that they intended to seek
Rule 11 sanctions against him if he pursued the action. Mr. Barnard elected
to press forward with the lawsuit.
On October 23, 2007, the court conducted a hearing in this matter.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint,
finding that it was frivolous and had been filed in bad faith, justifying an
award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
Memorandum Decision, 06/27/08, pp. 2-3, Exhibit "C" attached, R. 749 - 750.
The court has already found that this complaint was meritless and
was filed in bad faith. This lawsuit was not about interpreting and fairly
enforcing the City's election ordinances as to all mayoral candidates. It was
an attempt to discredit one particular candidate in an attempt to influence
the upcoming election. This case was an abuse of the judicial process, and
the court concludes that it was filed for an improper purpose within the
10

When challenging a district court's findings of fact, the challenging party must
show that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the district court, is legally
insufficient to support the contested finding. Still Standing at f 8. The facts which were
presented to and considered by the trial court are very limited
11

The trial court did not set out distinct and specific findings of fact, but instead
interspersed them amongst legal analysis and legal conclusions. R. 748; 763.
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meaning of Rule 11(b)(1). Because this lawsuit was frivolous and filed in
bad faith and for an improper purpose, the court concludes that Mr. Barnard
has violated subdivisions (1) and (2) and Rule 11(b).
Memorandum Decision, 06/27/08, p. 3, Exhibit "C" attached, R. 750; see Order,
07/29/08, p. 3, Exhibit "D" attached, R. 765.
2

The Court adopts and incorporates its February 29, 2008
Memorandum Decision and April 8, 2008 Order as if fully set
forth herein.
Order, 07/29/08, p. 3, ftnote 2, Exhibit "D" attached, R. 765.
As per above, the trial court's findings to support its conclusion of a Rule 11
violation are synthesized as:
•

On October 11, 2007, counsel for the City Defendants sent a warning letter.

•

The court had already found that the complaint was meritless and filed in bad faith.
The Court incorporated its Februaiy 29, 2008 Memorandum Decision and April 8,
2008 Order as per Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended).

•

This lawsuit was not about interpreting and fairly enforcing the City's election
ordinances as to all mayoral candidates.

•

This lawsuit was an attempt to discredit one particular candidate.12

•

This suit attempted to improperly influence the outcome of the mayoral election.12
Even if the foregoing statements were supported by evidence, they are not

sufficient under Rule 11 to establish the elements necessary to impose sanctions.
The trial court's findings regarding Rule 11 sanctions do not reveal the court's
reasoning clearly enough that this Court can apply the appropriate standard of review to

12

The mere filing of this action does not support this finding; no other evidence is
presented.
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each element of the trial court's ruling.
We conclude that this purported factual finding, . . . simply
paraphrasing the language of rule 11, and standing by itself without any
detailed factual findings particularizing its conclusions is insufficiently
specific as a matter of law to support the imposition of rule 11 sanctions.
We have said that a trial court is required to make explicit findings of fact
in support of its legal conclusions. See Willey v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 230
(Utah 1997). This is particularly necessary in the rule 11 area. The law
requires that a trial court make a series of specific factual findings as a
predicate for concluding that the rule has been violated, and then must
determine the appropriate sanction. The trial court's findings and
conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough that an
appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review to each part of
the trial court's ruling. What we have before us is plainly insufficient for
that purpose.
Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78,110, 985 P.2d 255, 258-250.
A trial court must also make specific factual findings as a predicate to determine
the appropriate sanction. Id. The court below made no findings and included no
discussion as to how or why it determined an award of fees was appropriate or that ten
thousand dollars ($10,000.00) was an appropriate amount. See R. 748; R. 763 (Exhibits
"C" & "D"attached).
No facts before the trial court support the factual findings and the legal conclusion
that Rule 11 was violated and that an award of attorney fees was an appropriate sanction.
B.

Findings as per Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended)
The trial court's award of fees under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended)

is pertinent to this appeal because the Rule 11 sanctions were based, in large part, upon
that prior improper and erroneous ruling.
The trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support an award of attorney
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fees under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). There were insufficient facts
before the trial court for it to make the necessary findings. The memorandum decision ®.
619) and the order based thereon (R. 658) which contain the inadequate findings are
attached to this brief. Exhibits "A" and "B" attached.
The trial court's factual findings13 to purportedly support the fee award under Ut.
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) are:
At the hearing in this matter held on October 23, 2007, the Court
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with
prejudice. This Court also found that the plaintiffs' complaint was
frivolous and had been filed in bad faith.
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/2008, p. 1, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 619.
. . . The Court has already rejected plaintiffs' interpretation of the
City ordinance and their position in the litigation and has already
determined that plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought without merit and in bad
faith. The only issue remaining before the Court is the amount of attorney's
fees and costs, if any, to be awarded to the defendants.
. . . Rather than address the present issue, the affidavits of plaintiffs]
essentially restate[] the conclusions that are totally inconsistent with the
prior rulings of this court.
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 2, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 620.

13

The trial court did not set out distinct separate findings of fact, but interspersed
them amongst legal analysis and legal conclusions. R. 619; 658.
This Court has stated:
The Utah Supreme Court has . .. cautioned against conflating the
issues of merit and bad faith. See, e.g., Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen,
2005 UT 46, lfl[ 10, 16-17, 122 P.3d 556; In re Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, |
49, 86 P.3d 712. Consequently, we examine the without merit element of
section 78-27-56 independently of the bad faith requirement.
Gallegos v. Llovd. 178 P.3d 922, 2008 UT App 40, ^ 22, certiorari denied 189 P.3d 1276.
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This lawsuit was not about interpreting an ordinance and having all
the candidates removed from the ballot because of their failure to make
disclosures. It was an attempt to discredit and remove Matthew Godfrey as
a candidate for mayor.
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 3, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 621.
. . . The judicial system should not be used for political and
vindictive purposes and plaintiffs and their attorneys have a duty to make
sure that a lawsuit has merit and is brought in good faith. Filing frivolous
non-meritorious lawsuits targeting a person running for public office should
be chilled.
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 3, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 621.
. . . Approximately one-third of those plaintiffs have signed an
identical affidavit informing the court that they had the exact same feeling
about filing the lawsuit, went through the exact same process of reviewing
the ordinance, and reached the exact same conclusions. None of the twenty
plaintiffs who signed identical affidavits apparently reviewed the memorandum prepared by their City Attorney which put them on notice that their
position was flawed. None have informed the court that their counsel
reviewed the memorandum of the City Attorney or were given the opportunity to correct their misunderstanding of the plain language of the
ordinance prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Not one of the twenty plaintiffs
informed the court by way of affidavit that their attorney had been put on
notice that Defendants would be seeking attorney fees if the lawsuit was not
voluntarily withdrawn and decided to proceed not withstanding the risk of
substantial award of attorneys fees.
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, pp. 3-4, Exhibit "A" attadhed, R. 621 - 622.
This Court does not believe that the vast majority of the plaintiffs in
this case had any idea of the consequences of filing this vindictive,
frivolous, bad faith action.
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 4, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 622; Order, 04/08/08,
pp. 6-7, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 663 - 664.
[1] c. . . . Mayor Godfrey was not required to provide the name of
his PCC [Personal Campaign Committee] on his financial statements.
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Order, 04/08/08, p. 4, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 661.
[1] d. Contrary to plaintiffs' position, the ordinance did not require
that registration and financial statements set forth the specific name of the
candidate's PCC. Rather, the ordinance is very clear and simple and places
the responsibility to make such filings on the candidate.
Order, 04/08/08, p. 5, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 662.
[2] d. The Court specifically determined that the plaintiffs' lawsuit
was without merit. This determination was based upon the fact that the
ordinance in question is simple and clear, and the plaintiffs' position is
entirely unsupported by the plain language of the ordinance and in direct
conflict with Utah statutory construction law. Stated differently, plaintiffs
lawsuit was frivolous and had no basis in law or fact.
[2] e. The Court further determined that plaintiffs brought this
lawsuit in bad faith. Unlike many cases, plaintiffs' claims were reviewed,
analyzed and appropriately rejected by the Ogden City Attorney before this
lawsuit was filed. The Court reviewed the City Attorney's memorandum
addressing plaintiff Dorothy Littrell's complaints and found the memorandum to be accurate and on point. The City Attorney's memorandum put
plaintiffs on notice that their position lacked any merit. Additionally, the
timing of plaintiffs' lawsuit (filed just weeks before the general election)
and the fact that plaintiffs targeted only Mayor Godfrey in their lawsuit
(even though he used the same forms as every other candidate and no other
candidate listed the name of the PCC on the registration and financial
statements) further demonstrates that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in bad
faith and in an effort to improperly influence the outcome of the election.
These facts all establish that (1) plaintiffs lacked an honest belief in the
propriety of their actions; (2) plaintiffs intended to take unconscionable
advantage of the defendants through their actions; and (3) the plaintiffs
intended to improperly influence the outcome of the mayoral election
through their actions.
Order, 04/08/08, pp. 5-6, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 662 - 663.
[2] h. The court also relies on the reasons set forth in the Court's
Memorandum Decision dated February 29, 2008.
Order, 04/08/08, p. 7, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 664.
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As per above, although mixed and combined with consideration of the merits of
pfamfr'AV cfaims, the trial court's findings to support a concision of bad faith are
synthesized as:
The ordinance did not require that registration and financial statements set forth
the specific name of the candidate's PCC.
•

The questioned ordinance is very clear and simple and places the responsibility to
make required filings on the candidate.
The plaintiffs' position is unsupported by the plain language of the ordinance and
ill direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law.l
The lawsuit was an attempt to discredit and remove Matthew Godfrey as a
candidate for mayor.14
The lawsuit targeted only one candidate.
Plaintiffs' claims were reviewed and rejected by the City Attorney before this
lawsuit was filed. Plaintiffs did not review the memo prepared by the City
Attorney. From that memo, plaintiffs were on notice that their position lacked
merit.
Plaintiffs did not reveal to the court that they w^re given the opportunity to correct
their misunderstanding of the ordinance prior to the filing of the lawsuit.
Plaintiffs did not reveal to the court that their attorney had been put on notice that
Defendants would seek attorney fees if the lawsuit was not voluntarily withdrawn.
The vast majority of the plaintiffs did not understand the consequences of filing a
vindictive, frivolous, bad faith action.
The timing of plaintiffs' lawsuit was suspect (filed jupt weeks before the general
election).
The lawsuit was an effort to improperly influence the outcome of the election.14
14

The mere filing of this action does not suppoit this finding; no other evidence is
presentecl.
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Even if the foregoing statements were supported by evidence, they are not
sufficient under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) to establish frivolousness
and bad faith necessary to support an award of attorney fees.

V.

PLAINTIFFS PENALIZED FOR SEEKING DECLARATORY RELIEF
This action sought declaratory relief.15 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides a

means for securing a judicial adjudication of legal rights and the interpretation of
ordinances and statutes. Parker v. Rampton. 497 P.2d 848, 851-852 (Utah 1977); Utah
Code Ann. § 78-33-2 (1953 as amended)., The Act grants jurisdiction to Utah district
courts to hear complaints seeking declaratory relief. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953 as
amended).
Utah courts are to be indulgent in entertaining actions brought to achieve the
objectives of the Declaratory Judgment Act, and more particularly so where there is
substantial public interest to be served by settlement of issue. Salt Lake County v. Salt
Lake City. 570 P.2d 119, 121 (Utah 1977). A declaratory judgment is proper remedy
"whenever it will serve a useful purpose in settling the uncertainty and insecurity giving
rise to proceeding." Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748, 751 (Utah 1944).
The statutory provisions regarding declaratory judgments are to be broadly
construed to serve the purpose of resolving questions and ending uncertainty as to legal

15

"Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a determination regarding defendants'
obligations under Ogden Municipal Code with regard to financial disclosures for
candidates and personal campaign committees for candidates for municipal offices." R.
2,f l\seeR. 3,19.
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rights. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12 (1953 as amended) provides:
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other
legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.
Plaintiffs were authorized under the Declaratory Judgment Act to bring this action
to have their rights and the construction, interpretation and applicability of provisions of
the Ogden City election code determined. Plaintiffs should not be penalized for utilizing
that statute in the exact manner and for the exact purpose for which it was enacted.

VI.

PLAINTIFFS NOT ALLOWED TO RESPOND TO THE ATTORNEYS FEE
MOTION
The trial court heard and granted the motion for attorney fees under Ut. Code Ann.

§ 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) without giving plaintiffs an opportunity to respond. With
no prior notice and over plaintiffs' counsel's objections, the trial court heard and granted
the motion for attorney fees. R. 802, Transcript, pp. 19-20; 23-24; 31-37.
Conducting that hearing and making that ruling violated the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, (Rule 7(c)) and basic constitutional due process protections.
No principle is more fundamental to the integrity of a society that
claims allegiance to the rule of law than the principle that a person may not
be deprived of his property without first being afforded due process of law.
This guarantee is enshrined in both the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of Utah. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. .
. . "[W]e long ago succinctly summarized the fundamental features of due
process, observing that it requires that notice be given to the person whose
rights are to be affected. It hears before it condemns, proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial." Pangea Techs., Inc. v.
Internet Promotions. Inc., 2004 UT 40, f 8, 94 P.3d 257 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The bare essentials of due process thus mandate adequate
notice to those with an interest in the matter and an opportunity for them to
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be heard in a meaningful manner. See Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, ^f 68,
100 P.3d 1177.
Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants. Inc.. 2007 UT 17, f 28, 156 P.3d 782, 788.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure owe their existence to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. They "[are] designed to
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts
[can] follow and rely upon." Gillett v. Price. 2006 UT 24, % 13, 135 P.3d
861 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our rules of
civil procedure lend operational expression to the abstract constitutional
promise of due process.
Id. at 129.
The order under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) is without basis and
is illegitimate having been granted without due process.16

VII.

PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS ARE NOT FRIVOLOUS
Defendants argued that plaintiffs' position was without merit because the Ogden

City Attorney concluded that Godfrey had not violated Ogden City election ordinances
and said so in a written memorandum. See R. 131. The court below found that argument
to be persuasive, if not, conclusive. R. 621 - 622; 662 - 663.
Plaintiffs clearly had the right to seek a declaratory judgment and a judicial
determination of their rights and the meaning of the ordinances. Plaintiffs argue that the
interpretation of Ogden City municipal code advocated by the defendants renders multiple
sections of Ogden City election code meaningless and is therefore legally defective. R.

16

Similarly, the trial court's failure to follow the dictates of Rule 11 before
imposing sanctions was a violation of due process.
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232-234. Plaintiffs' arguments have reasonable basis. Utah courts have repeatedly
rejected statutory interpretations that would render a statute "liseless and of no material
benefit." Industrial Commission v. Dalv Mining Co.. 172 P. 301, 306 (Utah 1918); see
also Thomas v. Color Country Mangmt. 2004 UT 12, ^ 46, 84 P.3d 1201 (Chief Justice
Durham concurring) (Utah 2004); and, State ex rel E.H.. 880 P.2d 11,13 (Ut. Ct. App.
1994).

VIII. PLAINTIFFS BROUGHT SUIT IN GOOD FAITff
A.

The City Attorney's legal opinion does not constitute a legal finding and is not
determinative of plaintiffs' good faith.
The court below determined that plaintiffs should not have filed this suit because

the City Attorney told the plaintiffs they were "wrong."17 The court indicated all
discussion should have ended when the City Attoreny informed plaintiffs that he had
determined their concerns were "without merit and contrary to the relevant ordinance."18
R. 134-135. However, an opinion of a City Attorney is not i finding of law and in no way
precludes a plaintiff from seeking a legal determination by a court, i.e., a declaratory
judgment. See Peterson v. South Salt Lake City, 987 P.2d. 57, 59 (Utah 1999).
Plaintiffs sincerely believed that Williams' interpretation of the ordinance was
legally flawed; therefore they sought a judicial determination. Plaintiffs' claims were

17

In litigation, it is rare that one party does not strongly inform the opposing party
that they are "wrong" and their legal position without merit.
18

If City Attorneys were always undeniably "correct," the workload of the courts
would be greatly reduced.
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based on a good faith belief that Williams' interpretation is legally defective.
B.

Plaintiffs could not file suit regarding other candidates.
Plaintiffs were sincerely concerned about enforcing Ogden City Code despite not

filing suit against all defaulting candidates. The Ogden City election code imposes
certain notice requirements before a candidate is subject to the penalties. Section 1-85(B). These notice requirements were satisfied only as to Godfrey. The City Recorder
notified Godfrey of Littrell's complaint pursuant to § l-8-5(A) on September 17, 2007.19
R. 7, | 34. Only Godfrey was given notice under § l-8-5(A). Plaintiffs could not have
sought an order compelling Mansell and Williams to act against other candidates.20
C.

The timing of the suit was necessitated by the Ogden City Code.
There is nothing sinister about the timing of the complaint. Plaintiff Littrell first

became aware of Defendant Godfrey's failure to file in September, 2007. She promptly
complained to the City Recorder, Mansell. R. 7, ^ 32. Mansell notified Godfrey of
Littrell's complaint on September 17, 2007. R. 7, % 34. Godfrey responded to Mansell
and asserted that he was not required to register or file financial declarations in the name
of "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey." R. 8,1 35. Littrell then demanded that
Mansell inspect the books of "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey." R. 9, ^ 41. When

19

The fact that Mansell acted upon Littrell's complaint and asked Godfrey to
respond shows certain merit to Littrell's concerns.
20

The thrust of this action was not against one candidate, but against the two (2)
city officials charged with overseeing the municipal elections. If the trial court had ruled
in favor of plaintiffs, that ruling would have been applicable to all candidates even though
not named as parties to this suit. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, t 12, 99 P.3d 842.
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Mansell failed to inspect the books and Williams failed to initiate legal proceedings,
plaintiffs promptly filed suit on October 1, 2007. Plaintiffs precisely followed the
procedure required under Ogden City election code. When they realized that neither
Mansell nor Williams were going to remedy a perceived violation, plaintiffs took legal
action. Plaintiffs sought only remedies specifically provided for by Utah statutes and
Ogden City election code. Had plaintiffs filed suit after the election, the equitable relief
sought would have been rendered moot.
The date of the filing of this lawsuit shows that plaintiffs wanted a resolution
before the November 6th election. That does not evince bad faith.
D.

No facts establish "lack of merit" nor "bad faith" in this action.
i)

Lack of Merit

A trial court's determination that a claim was without merit is a question of law. In
re: Olympus Const. LC. 2007 UT App 361, Tf 9, 173 P.3d 192. To establish that a claim
is without merit as per the statute, "a party must show that the claim is frivolous" or "of
little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d
149, 151 (Utah 1983). The mere fact that plaintiffs were not fully successful (that is, their
interpretation was ultimately not accepted by the trial Court) does not render their
complaint and claims "meritless" or "frivolous" under the statute. See icL
As to plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of the election ordinances, the trial court
provides little or no legal analysis and only strong conclusions. However, the trial court's
ruling does not establish that the claim was frivolous or had no basis in law or in fact.
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See id. Merely stating that the ordinance was "clear" does establish that plaintiffs'
claims were frivolous. The decision and order granting sanctions contains no discussion
or analysis of plaintiff s position or argument.
The trial court does not discuss the fact that plaintiffs sought and were granted
declaratory relief. While stating that plaintiffs' proposed interpretation was "wrong," the
trial court does not support a determination that plaintiffs' proposed interpretation was
frivolous and had no basis in law or in fact.
ii)

Bad Faith

A finding that plaintiffs' action was frivolous and/or lacked merit does not create a
presumption that the action was brought in bad faith, an additional and separate element
for an attorney fee award under the statute. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT
46, ]f 10, 22 P.3d 556. A frivolous action having no basis in law or fact is "without
merit," for attorney's fee purposes, but it is nevertheless "in good faith" as long as there is
an honest belief that it is appropriate and as long as there is no intent to hinder, delay,
defraud, or take advantage of the other pairty. Bover v. Boyer. 2008 UT App 138, | 24;
183 P.3d 1068. see Cady v.Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
. . . the mere fact that an action is meritless does not necessarily
mean that the action is also brought in bad faith. See Utah Depft of Soc.
Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1198 n. 6 (Ut. Ct.App.1991). Such an
interpretation would conflate the two prongs required under the statute.
Thus, it does not follow that simply because the [plaintiff] had no legal
foundation to bring the action that it was also acting in bad faith. Rather, a
finding of bad faith turns on a factual determination of a party's subjective
intent. Pennington. 973 P.2d at 939 n. 3. We recognized as much when
refusing to grant attorney fees in Cady... .671 P.2d at 151-52. We stated,
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Plaintiffs were clearly pursuing a meritless claim and better
preparation might well have disclosed that to them. However,
that conduct does not rise to lack of good faith. The evidence
must also affirmatively establish a lack of at least one of the
three elements of good faith heretofore discussed. There was
no evidence that plaintiffs lacked an honest (although illformed) belief in their claim . . .
Id at 152.
In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^ 49, 86 P.3d 712.
The mere fact that the court below declined to adopt plaintiffs' proposed
interpretation of the city ordinances does not establish bad faith. None of the facts found
by the trial court establish bad faith under Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983).
The trial court must conclude separately and distinctly, from a determination that
the action was "without merit" that a party's subjective intent and must find that the party
lacked good faith. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, ^j 11,
186 P.3d 1012; Still Standing Stable. LLC v. Allen. 2005 UT 46, f 9, 122 P.3d 556.
A finding of bad faith turns on a specific factual determination of a party's
subjective belief and intent. Still Standing at If 9; Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v.
Cannon. 2002 UT 99, | 23, 61 P.3d 1009, rehearing denied; Raile Family Trust ex rel
Raile v. Promax Dev. Corp.. 2001 UT 40, \ 14, n.2; 24 P.3d 980.
No facts supports a finding of bad faith on the part oft plaintiffs.
iii)

Lack of Merit" and "Bad Faith" are Distinct and Separate Elements

Issues of merit and bad faith should not be mixed and conflated in determining
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whether award of attorney fees is available under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as
amended). Gallegos v. Llovd. 2008 UT App 40, f 22, 178 P.3d 922, cert, denied 189
P.3d 1276; Still Standing at 111.
While an action "must be meritless to award attorney fees under section
78-27-56, the mere fact that an action is meritless does not necessarily mean
that the action is also brought in bad faith." [In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3,
86 P.3d 712] at \ 49 {citing Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d
1193, 1198 n. 6 (Ut. Ct.App.1991)). "[A] finding of bad faith turns on a
factual determination of a partyfs subjective intent." IcL_ (citing Pennington
v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998)).
Still Standing at % 9.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized
. . . although "[p]laintiffs were clearly pursuing a meritless claim and
better preparation might well have disclosed that to them . . . that conduct
does not rise to lack of good faith."
Still Standing at If 15 quoting Cady, 671 P.2d at 152.
"To establish a lack of good faith, or 'bad faith' under section 78-27-56, a
party must prove that one or more of these factors is lacking." [In re
Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, ^ 48]; see also Chipman v. Miller. 934 P.2d 1158,
1163 (Ut. Ct.App.1997) (reversing an order awarding attorney fees where
the trial court neither stated which of the bad faith factors applied nor
discussed any evidence supporting any factor). Thus, again, without such
further proof, lack of legal merit is insufficient for an attorney fee award
under this section.
Still Standing at 112, 122 P.3d 556.
Before the . . . the prevailing parties[] may recover attorney fees
under section 78-27-56, the trial court must make a factual finding that the
[other party] asserted their [claim or] defense in bad faith. See Cady v.
Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1983) (explaining that the terms "bad
faith" and "lack of good faith," for the purposes of section 78-27-56, are
synonymous). A finding of bad faith must be based on at least one of the
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following three factors: "(I) The party lacked an honest belief in the
propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take
unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted
with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or
defraud others." Valcarce \v. Fitzgerald"!. 961 P.2d [305] at 316 (citing
Cady,671P.2datl51).
Gallegos at ^ 15; Still Standing at If 12; Rohan v. Boseman. 2002 UT App 109, f 39, 46
P.3d 753, rehear denied, cert, denied 59 P.3d 603; Wardley at \ 29; Chipman v. Miller,
934 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Utah 1997). No evidence in this case supports a finding of any one
of the factors required to establish bad faith.
The burden is on the party seeking an award under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56
(1953 as amended) to establish bad faith. The City Defendants have not done so.
Factor (i): Uncontroverted affidavits establish plaintiffs had an honest belief in the
propriety of their actions. R. 322-470. They acted with good motivations. Id. No
evidence shows the sixty-two (62) plaintiffs had any improper intent or purpose. The
sparse findings the trial court made {supra, pp. 34-37) do not begin to show plaintiffs
"lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question."
Factor (ii): There is no evidence that plaintiffs "intended to take unconscionable
advantage of others." Rule 11. No evidence shows plaintiffs acted in an unconscionable
manner or for an unconscionable purpose. Plaintiffs merely sought an interpretation and,
if appropriate, application of Ogden City election ordinance^.
Factor (iii): No evidence indicates plaintiffs "intended to or acted with the
knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others." Rule
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11. Nothing suggests dilatory tactics or other efforts calculated to harass the opposing
party and/or drive up litigation costs.
The factual findings made by the trial court, even if they were true, do not tend to
show, much less prove, any one of the factors required to establish bad faith. Supra, pp.
34-37.

CONCLUSION
Defendants did not comply with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendants' "warning letter" was not a motion made and served as Rule 11
requires. Plaintiffs were not afforded the mandatory safe harbor. Plaintiffs' counsel was
served with a Rule 11 motion over five (5+) months after the oral dismissal of the
complaint. Rule 11 motions filed after a dismissal of the underlying case must be denied.
Granting sanctions without compliance with the provisions of Rule 11 constitutes a denial
of due process.
The trial court based its award of fees under Rule 11 upon its earlier erroneous
award under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). The earlier mistaken award
could not validly support the later Rule 11 award.
No facts support the Rule 11 sand ions. No findings of fact made by the trial court
support the Rule 11 sanctions.
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Findings of fact are required to support the fee awards under Ut. Code Ann. § 7827-56 (1953 as amended). Contrary to this requirement, the court below failed to make
independent findings or made such findings based on insufficient facts.
This action was brought in good faith under Utah Declaratory Judgment Act and
sought the exact relief provided by that statute. Thus, plaintiffs should not have been
assessed attorney fees even though the trial court rejected plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of the ordinances.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) authorizes an award of attorney
fees only upon a finding that the suit (a) was frivolous and (ti) was not brought in good
faith. In this case, both elements are lacking. First, plaintiffs reasonably argued
defendants' interpretation of the relevant sections of Ogden City election code is legally
flawed because it renders the ordinance useless. Second, defendants fail to meet their
burden to show that plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in bad faith. Plaintiffs' affidavits
establish that they acted in the public interest and in good faith. None of the three
elements to establish a lack of good faith are present in this case.
The trial court did not allow plaintiffs to respond to tlie motion for attorney fees
precipitously hearing and granting that motion over the objections of plaintiffs' counsel.
That earlier ruling entered without due process can not support the Rule 11 sanctions
which are the subject matter of this appeal.
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RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the decision below imposing sanctions under Rule 11, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure should be reversed and the Court should enter an order denying
the Rule 11 motion as a matter of law.
Appellant should be awarded his costs and fees incurred below and in this
appeal.21
DATED this 22nd day of DECEMBER 2008.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Appellant

21

As the "prevailing party" in successfully opposing the Rule 11 motion, appellant
is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Rule 11(c)(1)(A), Ut.R.Civ.Pro.
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ADDENDUM
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UT. CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825. ATTORNEY FEES-AWARD WHERE ACTION
OR DEFENSE IN BAD FAITH-EXCEPTIONS (FORMERLY § 78-27-56)
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and
not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party
under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the
court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1).

i

RULE ll(b)-(c). SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND
OTHER PAPERS; REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT; SANCTIONS
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper
to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;

©) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How initiated.
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but
shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service
of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged
paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or
opposing the motion. . ..
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing
an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision
(b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
n

comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a
nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant
of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a
direct result of the violation.
#

*

*

(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement
of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be
sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed.

iii

EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING OF OCTOBER 23, 2007.
BEFORE THE HON. PARLEY BALDWIN, JUDGE
TRANSCRIPT, R. 802 ETSEQ.

Attorney Fees Motion (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-59 (1953 as amended))
Heard & Decided Without Notice or Opportunity to Respond
Mr. Barnard: If I may, Your Honor. My understanding is that the
attorneys' fees motion is not before the Court today. It's not in the notice
that I received from the Court, and I've not responded to their motion for
attorneys' fees. I don't believe - 1 don't understand that it's properly before
the court today. (Transcript, 19:18-23)
Mr. Preston: Well, Your Honor, we had asked - and we understood that
all - all motions were going to be heard at the same time. We had - this
motion - we filed a motion for expedited briefing and this was included.
We informed the clerk that we wanted all motions heard at the same time. I
think it's - the Court can hear argument on it now at this point. (Transcript,
19:25 - 20:6)
The Court: You may proceed. (Transcript, 20:7)

Mr. Barnard: As I indicated, Your Honor, I've not responded to, and am
not prepared to deal with, the issue of the attorneys' fees. Although a
request was made to Your Honor to expedite this briefing, that wasn't
granted. Although there was a request to file an over length memo in this
case regarding attorneys' fees, that hasn't been granted. Mr. Preston makes
mention of a reply memo that he's argued from today which I've not seen
and I've not received from him. (Transcript, 23:24 - 24:7)

IV

Complaint Sought Declaratory Relief
The Court: The plaintiff seeks the following relief in their prayer in the
complaint. One, that a declaration that Godfrey is in violation of municipal
code 1-8-2A and C in that he has solicited, received, and spent campaign
contributions personally without having registered a personal campaign
committee with the city recorder's. (Transcript, 31:3-£)
*

*

*

The Court: Part of the prayer for relief, point two, is a declaration that
Godfrey is in violation of municipal code 1-8-2D in that he has not
registered his personal campaign committee, People to Re-elect Matthew
Godfrey, with the recorder. (Transcript, 31:15-19)
The Court: The plaintiffs ask for a declaration that Godfrey is in violation
of Ogden municipal code 1-8-4B in that his personal campaign committee,
People to Re-elect Matthew Godfrey, has not filed the required financial
disclosures with the Ogden City Recorder. (Transcript, 32:20-24)

Ruling from the Bench ::
Basis for Determination under Ut. Code Ann. §78-27-59 (1953 as amended)
The Court: Now let me go a step further. It is not my intent as a member
of the judiciary to place any kind of a chilling effect 6n members of the
public who are seeking redress from - from public officials or others. But
there is - in my mind always should be some consequence for taking the
actions that litigants want to take.
The - there is a section - it is 78-27-59. It talks about attorney fees
and awards where actions or defenses in bad faith and exceptions. This
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requires that in civil actions the Court shall, shall award attorneys' fees to
prevailing party if the Court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and brought or asserted in good faith, and then
there are some exceptions to that.
That is a two-prong requirement. One, in order for me to award
attorneys' fees, I must find that the action was brought without merit and
then determine whether or not it was brought - it must be brought or
asserted in good faith. (Transcript, 35:3-20)

The Court: As I have had a chance to review this particular case and the
law, first of all, I'm making a determination that this case was brought
without merit. As I've stated maybe a couple of times before, 1 think that
it-that the ordinance that's involved is - is very simple.
Now the question that I'm required to look at is whether or not it was
asserted in good faith. Unlike a lot of cases before this was brought it was
investigated, first of all, by the city attorney who issued a memorandum that
I have had a chance to review setting forth the law after a request by the
recorder's office to do that. I've had a chance to review that - that
document. (Transcript, 35:25 - 36:11)

The Court: I have read with interest the discussion that the city attorney's
- city attorney had in that memorandum that has been submitted. I think
that that in itself would put those who were in a position to bring this
lawsuit on notice.
In addition, I am perplexed that this action brought by the public, and
Mr. Barnard referred - referred to this, that - that maybe given time all of
the candidates would be brought in. They weren't, and this action - it
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would have compelled me to take everyone off of the - off of the ballot.
This was directed specifically at this candidate. And taking that in
mind, the nature of the bringing of this action against this particular
defendant and the other defendants, the timing of it, tfyis Court finds that it
was brought in bad faith.
Mr. Barnard, I want to give you an ample opportunity to respond to
attorneys' fees. I'll ask that the parties submit those to me, and I'll review
them. And, again, once I make the finding, the Court is required to make a
reasonable attorneys' fees, but then it gives me some discretion, and you
may respond to that. (Transcript, 36:16-37:12)

w
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ATTACHMENTS
ATTACHMENT "A":

Memorandum Decision Awarding Fees under Ut. Code
Ann.§ 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). R. 619-623.

ATTACHMENT "B":

Order Awarding Fees under Ut. Code Ann.§ 78-27-56
(1953 as amended). R. 658-666.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

DOROTHY E. LITTRELL; JAMES R.
BRILEY, et al,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

FEB 2 9 MB

Civil No. 070905792 WR

vs.

Honorable Parley R. Baldwin
CINDI MANSELL, Ogden City
Recorder; GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden
City Attorney; and, MATTHEW
GODFREY,

FILED
FEB 2 9 2008
SFOOND
DISTRICT COURT

At the hearing in this matter held on October 23, 2007, the Court granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice. This Court also found
that the plaintiffs' complaint was frivolous and had been filed in bad faith. This Court
allowed the defendants to file Attorney's Fee Affidavits and allowed the Plaintiffs to respond
to the affidavits. The defendants, Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams, filed their Attorney's
Fee Affidavit of Stanley J. Preston which set forth the attorney's fee and cost incurred by
them. Defendant, Matthew Godfrey, filed an Attorney's Fee Affidavit of Robert A. Echard
which sets forth the attorney's fee incurred by him. Plaintiffs filed their Response and
Opposition to Defendants's Motion for Attorney's Fees and alsq filed a series of affidavits
from counsel, Brian Barnard, lead plaintiff Dorothy Littrell (as she was referred to by her
Memorandum Decision

counsel), and other individual nlaintiffs.
i •nil iiiii urn
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In the Ogden City Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response and Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Fees, they refer to two newspaper articles from the Standard
Examiner, one dated October 4, 2007, and another dated October 24, 2007. Plaintiffs have
made a motion to strike Exhibit A of the Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response and
Opposition to Defendants' Motion For Fees and Exhibit One of Defendants' Consolidated
Memorandum. The Court grants the Motion To Strike Newspaper Articles and does not
consider them in the ruling on attorney fees and costs.
Plaintiffs argue that the court should not award any fees because their complaint had
merit, was not frivolous, and was not filed in bad faith. The Court has already rejected
plaintiffs' interpretation of the City ordinance and their position in the litigation and has
already determined that plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought without merit and in bad faith. The
only issue remaining before this Court is the amount of attorney's fees and costs, if any, to
be awarded to the defendants.
Other than the affidavit of the lead plaintiff, Dorothy E. Littrell, Plaintiffs counsel
filed 20 affidavits that are all essentially identical and are merely a boiler plate production.
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56 provides that the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a
prevailing party after the court determines that the action was without merit and not asserted
in good faith unless the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. Rather
than address the present issues, the affidavit essentially restates conclusions that are totally
inconsistent with the prior rulings of this court.
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This lawsuit was not about interpreting an ordinance and having all the candidates
removed from the ballot because of their failure to make disclosures. It was an attempt to
discredit and remove Matthew Godfrey as a candidate for mayc^r.
Plaintiffs argue that an award of attorney's fees will have a chilling effect on future
plaintiffs seeking judicial assistance to interpret city ordinances. The public should exercise
the rights 10 seek redress from the courts on important issues fro^n all forms of government.
Thejudicial system should not be used for political and vindictive purposes andplaintiffs and
their attorneys have a duty to make sure that a lawsuit has merit and is brought in good faith.
Filing frivolous non-meritorious lawsuits targeting a person running for a public office
should be chilled. The legislature in Utah has determined by the passage of Utah Code Ann.
78-27-56 that a method of chilling those cases brought in bad faith and without merit is by
awarding attorney's fees.
The challenge in this case is a group of plaintiffs who have been recruited to
participate in this lawsuit who are now facing participation in a judgment for substantial
attorney fees. Approximately one-third of those plaintiffs have Signed an identical affidavit
informing the court that they had the exact same feeling about filing the lawsuit, went
through the exact same process of reviewing the ordinance, and reached exactly the same
conclusions. None of the twenty plaintiffs who signed identical affidavits apparently
reviewed the memorandum prepared by their City Attorney wblich put them on notice that
their position was flawed. None have informed the court that their counsel reviewed the
memorandum of the City Attorney or were given the opportunity to correct their
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misunderstanding of the plain language of the ordinance prior to the filing of the lawsuit.
Not one of the twenty plaintiffs informed the court by way of affidavit that their attorney had
been put on notice that the Defendants would be seeking attorney fees if the lawsuit was not
voluntarily withdrawn and decided to proceed not withstanding the risk of substantial award
of attorneys fees.
This Court does not believe that the vast majority of the plaintiffs in this case had any
idea of the consequences of filing this vindictive, frivolous, bad faith action. Nevertheless,
they must now take some responsibility for the expenses that have been born by the
defendants. The Court grants judgment against the plaintiffs and in favor of the defendant,
Ogden City, Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams in the amount of $14,448.67 and in favor of
the defendant, Matthew Godfrey, in the amount of $718.75.
This result does not preclude the parties from requesting sanctions under Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures.
Attorneys for the Defendants shall prepare the appropriate order.
DATED this 3tf

^ a y of February, 2008.

J
Parlev
arley R. Baldwin
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing decision was mailed,
first-class, postage prepaid, on this o f i
day of February, 2^08, to the following:

Brian M. Barnard, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
D. Jason Hawkins, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant, Ogden City
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Robert A. Echard, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant, Godfrey
2491 Washington Blvd. Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401

STANLEY J. PRESTON (4119)
D. JASON HAWKINS (9182)
SNOW. CHRISTENS EN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams
10 Exchange Place. Eleventh Floor
Post Office~Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801)363-0400

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT

DOROTHY E. LITTRELL; JAMES R. BRJJLEY;
RULON YORGASON; CHARLES L.
MAGRUDER; LILY MAGRUDER; CRISTINA
H. RODRIGUEZ; SAUL R. AGUTLAR;
MILTON RODRIGUEZ; REBECCA P.
HERNANDEZ; MELINDA FERNANDEZ NIX;
RAMON AGUILAR; VIVIAN M. CLAY;
SHERRY GALLEGOS; EDDDE J. GALLEGOS;
AFTON L. HOSKINS; SAMUEL FERNANDEZ;
RAYMOND D. ANDERSON; MIKE
GALBRAITH; ROBERT D. BLAIR; STEVEN L.
ZAMPEDRI; THOMAS MAZOKO; HELEN
DELGADO; DONNA L. MARTI; EVO MARTI;
DONALD C. MARSING: SENORINA D.
FERNANDEZ: EPIFANO GALLEGOS;
1SHELLE EASTMAN; GABRIEL MARTINEZ;
BASIL BEECH: SHARON BEECH: DON K.
WILSON: DAVID THOMPSON: JEREMY •
KILGORE: AMANDA KILGORE: MANCI
BYERS: DROOK LARSCN, KATIE
SPENDLOVE: JASON RUSCH: DAVID L
RUSCH: CYNTHIA RUSCH; LANEIL
LARSENt LAVERE W. RAWLINS; F. CRAIG
HAZEN: KEITH TISHER; ROBERT II. CATC.
THOMAS I. DOLPH: LILLIAN MEDINA: ART
FRAG A: DIN A FRAG A: DAWN FRAG A:
PEDRO HERNANDEZ. SR.:

ORDER:
(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS TO DISMISS;
(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS; |
(3) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR IMMEDIATE INJUNCTION AND
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT; AND
(4) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Case No. 070905792

Judae Parley R. Baldwin

JOHN HERNANDEZ; JACKIE WATKINS;
HERLINDA HERNANDEZ; PHILLIP
FERNANDEZ: FELICIA FERNANDEZ; LINDA
FRAGA; LACK B. BLAIRO; and, RONNIE
HALES,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CINDIMANSELL, Ogden City Recorder; GARY
WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney; and
MATTHEW GODFREY,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on October 23, 2007, in connection with
plaintiffs' Complaint Seeking Extraordinary Writ, plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Injunction
and Extraordinary Writ, defendants' Motions to Dismiss and defendant Mansell and Williams'
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. At this hearing, a number of plaintiffs were present and
plaintiffs were represented by their attorney Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal Clinic.
Defendants Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams were present and represented by their attorneys
Stanley J. Preston and D. Jason Hawkins of the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
Defendant Matthew Godfrey was also present and represented by his attorney Robert A. Echard
of the law firm of Robert Echard & Associates, PC.
At the conclusion of the October 23, 2007 hearing, the Court denied plaintiffs' Motion for
Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ, granted defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and
granted defendants Mansell and Williams* Motion for Attorneys1 Fees and Costs. The Court
reserved on ruling on that amount of fees and costs to be awarded to defendants, instructed

counsel for the defendants to prepare and file attorney's fee affidavits, and informed plaintiffs
that they had the right to respond/object to these affidavits.
On or about November 16, 2007, defendants Mansell and Williams filed the Attorney's
Fee Affidavit of Stanley J. Preston, seeking fees and costs incurredlas of October 31, 2007, in the
amount of $28,914.21. Plaintiffs filed a response wherein they objected to the fee affidavit. In
response, defendants Mansell and Williams conceded that there was one minor clerical mistake
in the amount of 516.87, reducing the actual amount of fees and costs incurred to $28,897.34.
On or about December 20, 2007, defendant Matthew Godfrey filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees
with a supporting affidavit in the amount of $1,437.50. Plaintiffs filed a response wherein they
objected to that fee affidavit.
During the course of briefing the issue of attorney's fees and costs, defendants Mansell
and Williams referred the Court to two newspaper articles from th^ Standard Examiner. On or
about December 28, 2007, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Newspaper Articles.
On February 29, 2008, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision in this matter, wherein
it awarded defendants Mansell and Williams attorneys fees and coqts in the amount of
314,448.67, awarded defendant Godfrey attorneys fees and costs in the amount of S718.75,
granted plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Newspaper Articles, and instructed defendants to prepare an
appropriate order.
Accordingly, based upon the extensive memoranda and affidavits submitted by the
parties, together with the exhibits thereto, as well as the arguments presented during the October
23. 2007 hearing, and being fully informed in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ is DENIED,

Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Complaint herein is
hereby dismissed in its entirety with prejudice and on the merits, based on the following grounds:
a.

Mayor Godfrey established a personal campaign committee ("PCC"),

which was named "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey," as was required by Ogden
Municipal Code § 1-8-2A and C.
b.

Mayor Godfrey registered his PCC with the City Recorder as required by

Subsection 1-8-2D of the Ogden Municipal Code. The registration form that Mayor
Godfrey filed with the City Recorder was prepared and provided by die City and satisfied
the minimal requirements of Subsection 1-8-2D. It was (1) "a written statement," (2)
"signed by the candidate," (3) "'setting forth that the candidate's personal campaign
committee has been appointed or elected," and (4) "giving the name and address of each
member and the secretary of the committee." Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-2D. The
ordinance does not require that the name of the candidate's PCC be listed on the
registration form.
c.

Mayor Godfrey filed the necessary financial statements with the City

Recorder as required by Section 1-8-4 of the Ogden Municipal Code. That filing was
made in a timely manner on forms prepared and provided by the City, and complied with
the requirements of Section 1-8-4. Mayor Godfrey was not required to provide the name
of his PCC on his financial statements. Rather Section 1-8-4B states that the financial
statement 4iall be tiled by the "candidate or political campaign committee."
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d.

Contrary to plaintiffs' position, the ordinance did not require that

registration and financial statements set forth the specific nafrie of the candidate's PCC.
Rather, the ordinance is very clear and simple and places the responsibility to make such
filings on the candidate.
2.

Defendants' respective Motions for Attorney's Fees and Costs are GRANTED,

and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, defendants Mansell and Williams are hereby
awarded judgment against plaintiffs in the amount of $14,448.67, and defendant Godfrey is
hereby awarded judgment against plaintiffs in the amount of $718.75, based on the following
grounds:
a.

The Court does not desire to chill members 6f the public from exercising

their constitutional rights to seek redress from the courts. However, there are
consequences for bringing a meritless lawsuit in bad faith.
b.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides that "the court shall award

reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith/'
(Emphasis added).
c.

Based on the Court's rulings, the defendants were the prevailing parties in

this case..
d.

The Conn specifically determined that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was without

merit. This determination was based upon the fact that the ordinance in question is
simple and clear, and plaintiffs* position is entirely unsupported by the plain language of

the ordinance and in direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law. Stated
differently, plaintiffs* lawsuit was frivolous and had no basis in law or fact.
e.

The Court further determined that plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in bad

faith. Unlike many cases, plaintiffs' claims were reviewed, analyzed and appropriately
rejected by the Ogden City Attorney before this lawsuit was filed. The Court reviewed
the City Attorney's memorandum addressing plaintiff Dorothy Littrell's complaints and
found the memorandum to be accurate and on point. The City Attorney's memorandum
put plaintiffs on notice that their position lacked any merit. Additionally, the timing of
plaintiffs' lawsuit (filed just weeks before the general election) and the fact that plaintiffs
targeted only Mayor Godfrey in their lawsuit (even though he used the same forms as
every other candidate and no other candidate listed the name of their PCC on their
registration and financial statements) further demonstrate that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit
in bad faith and in an effort to improperly influence the outcome of the election. These
facts ail establish that (1) plaintiffs lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their
actions; (2) plaintiffs intended to take unconscionable advantage of the defendants
through their actions; and (3) the plaintiffs intended to improperly influence the outcome
of the mayoral election through their actions.
f.

The amount of fees and costs awarded herein are more than reasonable

considering that the awards represent only one half (1/2) of the amounts requested in
defendants' affidavits. The Court could have awarded the full amount of fees and costs
incurred but chose not to because the Coun believes that the majority of the plaintiffs aid
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not understand the consequences of filing this vindictive, frivolous, bad faith lawsuit
Nevertheless, they must now take some responsibility for the expenses that have been
born by the defendants. Plaintiffs are jointly and severally liable for the amounts awarded
herein.1
g.

This ruling does not preclude the defendants from requesting additional

amounts as sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
h.

The Court also relies on the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum

Decision dated February 29, 2008.
3.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Newspaper Articles is G&ANTED. The Court

granted that motion and did not consider the newspaper articles in ruling on the issue of
attorney's fees and costs.
DATED this

day of

, 2008.
BY THE COURT

Judge Parley R. Baldwin
District Court Judge

!

Plaintiffs Don K. Wilson. Robert H. Cato, Brook Larsen and Laneil Larsen were
voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 prior to the October 23. 2Q07 hearing. Therefore, they
are not liable for the amounts awarded herein under Utah Code Annj § 78-27-56.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
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:
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Attorneys for Defendant Godfrey
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Stanley J. Preston
D. Jason Hawkins
z^ttorneys for Defendants Mansell and Williams
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OE WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

DOROTHY E. LITTRELL; JAMES R.
BRILEY; et al,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

JUN

CINDIMANSELL, Ogden City Recorder;
GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney;
and MATTHEW GODFREY,
Defendants.

2 7 2008

Judge Parley R. Baljrwin
SECOND
Case No. 070905792
DiSTRlCT COURT

Jtj

N 2 72006

This matter is before the court on three motions: Defendants\ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions;
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment; and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portion of
Reply Memo. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike is denied as moot; Defendants'
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is granted; and Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment
is granted.
I. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs ask the court to strike a portion of Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support
of Defendants Mansell and Williams' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. In this Reply, according to
Plaintiffs, Mansell and Williams argue for the first time that the court may award attorney fees
pursuant to its inherent power to manage its own affairs. Because this argument was mads for
the first time in a reply memorandum. Plaintiffs ask the court to strike this portion of Defendants'
memorandum. Because the court declines to exercise its inherent authority to impose sanctions,
u

the court considers the motion moot, Therefore, the motion to strike is denied.
Memorandum Decision
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II. Defendants' Rule 11 Motion
Defendants Mansell and Williams filed this motion to impose sanctions on Plaintiffs'
counsel, Mr. Barnard, under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(b) states as
follows:
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other
paper to the court[,] an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; [and]
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law[.]
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b). If the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the
court may, subject to certain conditions, impose an appropriate sanction upon the
attorney, law firm, or party that has violated subdivision (b). Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c).
On or about October 1, 2007, Plaintiffs, through Mr. Barnard, filed their
Complaint and Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ, seeking to have
Mayor Godfrey's name removed from the ballot in the November 2007 election. On or
about October 11, 2007, counsel for the Ogden City Defendants sent Mr. Barnard a letter
advising him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions against him if he pursued the
action. Mr. Barnard elected to press forward with the lawsuit.
On October 23, 2007, the court conducted a hearing in this matter. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, finding that it was
frivolous and had been filed in bad faith, justifying an award of attorney fees under Utah
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Code Ann. § 78-27-56. On February 29, 2008, the court issued its Memorandum
Decision, awarding the Ogden City Defendants attorney fees and costs in the amount of
$14,448.67, and awarding Godfrey attorney fees and costs in the amount of $718.75, The
Ogden City Defendants now seek to recover the balance of their attorney fees from Mr.
Barnard under Rule 11.
The court has already found that this complaint was meritless and was filed in bad
faith. This lawsuit was not about interpreting and fairly enforcing the City's election
ordinances as to all mayoral candidates. It was an attempt to discredit one particular
candidate in an attempt to influence the upcoming election. This ^ase was an abuse of the
judicial process, and the court concludes that it was filed for an improper purpose within
the meaning of Rule 11(b)(1). Because this lawsuit was frivolous and filed in bad faith
and for an improper purpose, the court concludes that Mr. Barnard has violated
subdivisions (1) and (2) of Rule 11(b).
The only issue remaining is the conditions subject to which the court may impose
a sanction, described in Rule 11(c). Specifically, Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides that a motion
for sanctions under Rule 11 must be served on the violating party 21 days before being
filed with the court, in order to give the violating party an opportunity to withdraw the
violating document or otherwise correct the violation. Mr. Barnard contends that a
formal Rule 11 motion was not served on him until after his complaint had been
dismissed. Therefore, according to Mr. Barnard, Defendants did qot comply with the safe
harbor provision of Rule 11, and Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate.

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 070905792
Page 4 of 7

Mr. Barnard's argument essentially identifies two potential problems with
Defendants' Rule 11 Motion. First, Defendants' October 11 letter, warning Plaintiffs that
Defendants would seek Rule 11 sanctions if Plaintiffs pursued the lawsuit, was not a
formal motion for sanctions, as required by Rule 11(c)(1)(A). Second, even if this letter
were considered proper under the rule, the complaint was involuntarily dismissed only 12
days after the letter was sent, depriving Plaintiffs of the 21-day safe-harbor period
required by Rule 11(c)(1)(A).
The purpose of the safe-harbor provision is to alert the violating party that his
position may be frivolous and that sanctions may be sought against him5 and to give him
an opportunity to correct the violation. Although Rule 11 technically requires the moving
party to serve a formal motion on the violating party, the purpose of Rule 11 is
accomplished just as well by a warning letter, such as the one sent to Plaintiffs' counsel in
this case, and on this basis, courts have found that such a letter substantially complies
with the requirements of Rule 11. See, e.g., Niesenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d
804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003); Methode Elecs., Inc. v. Adam Techs., Inc., 371 F.3d 923, 927 (7th
Cir. 2004). The court concludes that the letter sent to Mr. Barnard on October 11, 2007,
substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(A).
As to the 21-day requirement in Rule 11(c)(1)(A), the court notes that Mr.
Barnard had 12 days to withdraw the complaint before the hearing on October 23. This
was enough time for Mr. Barnard to consider the possibility of sanctions, and when he
and his clients proceeded with the hearing, they effectively rejected the warning. See id.
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As in the Methode case, Defendants here "did what they could to comply with Rule 11"
but "were prevented by the speed of events from granting a 21 -day period to withdraw the
allegation." Id. The court also notes that the only reason more time was not allowed to
pass was because Plaintiffs requested an expedited hearing, at which the complaint was
involuntarily dismissed. Mr. Barnard can not now use the expedited timetable that he
requested as a shield against Rule 11 sanctions. Under the circumstances of this case, the
court concludes that Defendants substantially complied with Rule 11 and that sanctions
are appropriate. The court, therefore, imposes a sanction on Mr. Barnard in the amount of
$10,000, payable to Defendants Mansell and Williams.
III. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment
Plaintiffs filed this motion after sending payment to Defendants for the previous award of
attorney fees. Defendants Mansell and Williams opposed the motion on the grounds that a final
judgment had not yet been entered, and Defendants felt it premature to deposit Plaintiffs' checks
at that time. An order was signed by the court on April 4, 2007, and filed on April 8, 2007,
granting the motion for attorney fees and awarding judgment of $14,448.67 against Plaintiffs, in
favor of Mansell and Williams. Apparently Defendants had not yet received a copy of this order
at the time they filed their opposition to Plaintiffs' motion. Because a final judgment has now
been entered, the court determines that the Defendants' opposition is moot. Therefore, Plaintiffs'
motion is granted.
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Counsel for Defendants Mansell and Williams is directed to prepare, circulate, and
submit an order consistent with this decision for the court's signature.
DATED this <3C> day of June, 2008.

Parley R. Baldwin
District Court Judge

kticti^ .
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JOHN HERNANDEZ; JACKIE WATKINS;
HERLINDA HERNANDEZ; PHILLIP
FERNANDEZ; FELICIA FERNANDEZ; LINDA
FRAGA; LACK B. BLAIRO; and, RONNIE
HALES,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CINDI MANSELL, Ogden City Recorder; GARY
WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney; and
MATTHEW GODFREY,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on three separate motions: (1) Defendants' Motion for
Rule 11 Sanctions; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Reply Memo; and (3) Plaintiffs'
Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment.1
Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
Defendants, Mansell and Williams (the "Ogden City Defendants") filed this motion to
impose sanctions on Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Brian M. Barnard, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. On or about October 1, 2007, Plaintiffs through their attorney, Mr.
Barnard, filed their Complaint and Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ, seeking
to have Mayor Godfrey's name removed from the ballot in the November 2007 mayoral election.
On or about October 11, 2007, counsel for the Ogden City Defendants sent Mr. Barnard a usafe

!

The Court issued a Memorandum Decision dated June 27, 2008, wherein it granted the
Ogden City Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions and Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction
of Judgment, and denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Reply Memo. The Court adopts
and incorporates its Memorandum Decision as if fully set forth herein.
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harbor" letter advising him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions against him if he pursued
the matter. Mr. Barnard elected to press forward with the lawsuit.
On October 23,2007, the Court conducted a hearing in this matter. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint, finding that it was frivolous and had been filed
in bad faith, justifying an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. On
February 29, 2008, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision, awarding the Ogden City
Defendants attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $14,448.67, and awarding Defendant Godfrey
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $718.75. On April 8, 2008, the Court entered its Order:
Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; Granting Defendants' Motions for Attorney's Fees and
Costs; Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ; and Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Newspaper Articles.2
On March 31, 2008, the Ogden City Defendants filed their Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
seeking to recover the balance of their attorney's fees from Mr. Barnard as sanctions under Rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court previously determined that the Complaint in this
case was meritless and was filed in bad faith. This lawsuit was not about interpreting and fairly
enforcing the Ogden City election ordinances as to all mayoral candidates. Rather, it was an attempt
to discredit one particular candidate in an attempt to improperly influence the outcome of the
mayoral election. This case was an abuse of the judicial process and it was filed for an improper
purpose. For the reasons set forth in the Ogden City Defendants' memoranda and the Court's

2

The Court adopts and incorporates its February 29, 2008 Memorandum Decision and
April 8, 2008 Order as if fully set forth herein.
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June 27,2008 Memorandum Decision, the Court grants the Ogden City Defendants' Motion for Rule
11 Sanctions. The Court imposes a sanction on Mr. Barnard in the amount of $10,000, payable to
Defendants Mansell and Williams. The Court finds this amount to be fair and reasonable in light
of the fact that it is only a portion of the fees and costs that the Ogden City Defendants reasonably
incurred in their effort to defend against this frivolous lawsuit.
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Portions of the Ogden City Defendants' Reply
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. According to Plaintiffs, the
Ogden City Defendants argue for thefirsttime in their reply memorandum that the Court may award
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to its broad inherent power to manage its own affairs. Because
this argument was made for the first time in a reply memorandum, Plaintiffs ask the Court to strike
this portion of the Ogden City Defendants' memorandum. Nevertheless, because the Court relied
solely upon Rule 11 to impose sanctions against Mr. Barnard, the Court considers the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Strike moot. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Reply Memo is denied.
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment
Plaintiffs filed this motion after sending payment to the Defendants for the previous award
of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The Ogden City Defendants
opposed the motion on the grounds that afinalorder had not yet been entered, and they felt it was
premature to deposit Plaintiffs' checks at that time. Because afinalorder has now been entered with
respect to this previous award of attorney's fees and costs, the Court determines that the Ogden City
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Defendants' opposition is moot. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment is
granted.
Accordingly, based upon the extensive memoranda submitted by the parties, together with
the exhibits thereto, as well as the arguments presented during the October 23,2007 hearing, together
with the Court's prior ralings in this matter, and being fully infibrmed in the premises, and good
cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Ogden City Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is GRANTED. The Court

imposes a sanction on Mr. Barnard in the amount of $10,000, payable to Defendants Mansell and
Williams. The Court finds this amount to be fair and reasonable in light of the fact that it is only a
portion of the fees and costs that the Ogden City Defendants reasonably incurred in their effort to
defend against this frivolous lawsuit.
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Reply Memo is DENIED. The Court did not

rely on its broad inherent power to impose Rule 11 Sanctions.
///
///
///
///
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3.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment is GRANTED. The Court orders

the clerk to enter the Satisfaction of Judgment satisfying the judgment previously entered against the
Plaintiffs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
DATED t h i ^ f d a y of

U1/

/ 1

, 2008.
BY THE COURT

Judge Parley R. Baldwin
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

Brian M. laniard, Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/

ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES

Robert A. Echard, Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant Godfrey

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanley!. Preston, Attorney =^V
D. Jason Hawkins, Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants Mansell and
Williams

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment is GRANTED. The Court orders

the clerk to enter the Satisfaction of Judgment satisfying the judgment previously entered against the
Plaintiffs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
lis
DATED this-;

, 2008.
BY THE COURT

Judge Parley R. Baldwin
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

Brian M. Barnard, Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES

, lloDert A. Echard, Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant Godfrey

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanley J. Preston, Attorney
D. Jason Hawkins. Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants Mansell and
Williams
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the foregoing ORDER: (1) GRANTING THE OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RULE 11 SANCTIONS; (2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
OF REPLY MEMO; AND (3) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENTER
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT to be sent via U.S. mail to the following:

Brian M. Barnard, Attorney
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Robert A. Echard, Attorney
2491 Washington Blvd., #200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant Matthew Godfrey
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Plaintiff - CHARLES L MAGRUDER
Plaintiff - LILY MAGRUDER
Plaintiff - CRISTINA H RODRIGUEZ
Plaintiff - SAUL R AGUILAR
Plaintiff - MILTON RODRIGUEZ
Plaintiff - BASIL BEECH
Plaintiff - SHARON BEECH
Plaintiff - DON K WILSON - DISMISSED
Plaintiff - DAVID THOMPSON
Plaintiff - JEREMY KILGORE
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ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
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Credit:
Balance:
BAIL/CASH BONDS

0.00
0.00
00.00
0.00
0.00
00.00

Posted:
Forfeited:
Refunded:
Balance:

TRUST TOTALS

Trust Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Trust Balance Due:
Balance Payable:

11.31
11.31
0.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Amount Due:
155.00
Amount Paid:
155.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

21.00
21.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

21.50
21.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

16.50
16.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES
Amount Due:
1.47
Amount Paid:
1.4 7
Amount Credit:
0.00
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0.00

Balance:

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
15.00
Amount Paid:
15.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

3.00
3.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES
Amount Due:
1.4 7
Amount Paid:
1.4 7
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

205.00
205.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL
TYPE: REPORTER FEES
Original Amount Due:
150.00
Amended Amount Due:
138.69
Amount Paid:
138.69
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
Account Adjustments
Date
Oct 07, 2008
Transfer.

Amount
-11.31

Reason
Adjustment down due to Account

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appealb
Posted By: UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Posted:
300.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Refunded:
0.00
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300.00

Balance:

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: A p p e a l s
P o s t e d By:
UTAH LEGAL C L I N I C FOUNDATION
Posted:
5O0.00

Forfeited:
Refunded:
Balance:

0.00
0.00
500.00

TRUST DETAIL
Trust Description: Other Trust
Recipient: UTAH LEGAL CLINC FOUNDATION IN
Amount Due:
11.31
Paid In:
11.31
Paid Out:
11.31
CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
10-01- 07
10-01- 07
10-01- 07
10-01- 07

Judge W BRENT WEST assigned.
Filed: Complaint Seeking Extraordinary Writ
Fee Account created
Total Due:
155.00
COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Payment Received;
155.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
10-01- 07 Filed: Complaint
10-01- 07 Filed: Affidavit of Dorothy E Littrell
10-01- 07 Filed: Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ
Filed by: LITTRELL, DOROTHY E
10-01- 07 Filed: Request for Immediate Hearing
10-02- 07 Note: Bonnie gave file to Pam to set hearing
10-03- 07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
21.00
10-03- 07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
21.. 00
10-05- 07 Filed order: ORDER OF RECUSAL
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed October 05, 2007
10-09-07 Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN assigned.
10-09-07 Filed: RULE 41 DISMISSAL OF ROBERT H CATO
10-09-07 Filed: RULE 41 DISMISSAL OF DON WILSON
10-10-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 070905792 ID 10134898
ORAL ARGUMENTS is scheduled.
Date: 10/23/2007
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84 401
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN
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Hearing scheduled as to the request for Injunction and
Extraordinary Writ and the proposed Motion to Dismiss filed by
defense counsel.
Oral arguments for the request for an Injunction and Extraordinary
Writ will be heard along with the Defendant's Prpposed Motion to
Dismiss.
10-10-07 ORAL ARGUMENTS scheduled on October 23, 2007 at 02:00 PM in 3rd
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
10-10-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
21.50
10-10-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
21.50
10-11-07 Filed: ENTRY OF APPEARANCE - ROBERT A ECHARD FOR MAYOR GODFREY
10-11-07 Filed: Motion TO DISMISS
Filed by: ECHARD, ROBERT A
10-11-07 Filed: EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN OVER-LENGTH
MEMORANDUM
10-11-07 Filed: Motion FOR EXPEDITED BRIEFING SCHEDULE
Filed by: PRESTON, STANLEY J
10-11-07 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS1
MOTION FOR EXPEDITED BRIEFING SCHEDULE
10-11-07 Filed: Motion TO DISMISS (ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
Filed by: PRESTON, STANLEY J
10-11-07 Filed: Motion FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
Filed by: PRESTON, STANLEY J
10-11-07 Filed: CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS1
MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE INJUNCTION AND EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND IN
SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FE
10-11-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF CINDI MANSELL
10-11-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF GARY R WILLIAMS
10-11-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
16.50
10-11-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
16.50
10-12-07 Dismissed party - WILSON, DON K
10-12-07 Dismissed party - CATO, ROBERT H
10-19-07 Filed: RULE 41 DISMISSAL OF BROOK LARSEN & LANElL LARSEN
10-22-07 Filed: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
10-22-07 Filed: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
10-22-07 Dismissed party - LARSEN, BROOK
10-22-07 Dismissed party - LARSEN, LANEIL
10-22-07 Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMIS^
10-22-07 Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO MOTION TO EXPEDITE
10-22-07 Filed: NOTICE RE: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR FEES
10-23-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for HEARING ON MOTIONS
Judge:
PARLEY R BALDWIN
Clerk:
debbieg
PRESENT
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Plaintiff(s): DOROTHY E LITTRELL
Defendant(s): MATTHEW GODFREY
GARY WILLIAMS
Plaintiff's
Defendant's

Attorney(s):
Attorney(s):

BRIAN M BARNARD
ROBERT A ECHARD
D JASON HAWKINS
STANLEY J PRESTON

Video

Tape Number:

3D102307

Tape Count: 2:00-2:58

HEARING
This is time set for hearing on the motions filed before this
court. Brian Barnard is present representing the plaintiffs. Stan
Preston and Jason Hawkins are present representing the defendants'
Gary Williams and Cindi Mansell.
Robert Echard is present representing the defendant, Matthew
Godfrey.
Court finds the defendant, Matthew Godfrey, has complied with the
city ordiance. Court grants the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice
filed by the defendants.
Court finds this case was brought without merit and in bad faith.
The Court will allow the defendants to file their affidavit of
attorney fees and allow the plaintiff to respond to the motion for
attorney fees.
Total hearing time: 1 hour
10-23-07 Filed: Letter, Snow Christensen & Martineau
10-25-07 Filed: PLANITIFFS' REPLY MEMO IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PETITION
11-06-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN M. BARNARD
11-16-07 Filed: ATTORNEYS'' FEE AFFIDAVIT OF STANLEY J PRESTON
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA R. RODRIGUEZ
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA P HERNANDEZ
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF SAUL AGUILAR
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF RAMON AGUILAR
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF KATIE SPENDLOVE
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF BASIL BEECH
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R BRILEY
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND D ANDERSON
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID L. RUSCH
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF CYNTHIA RUSCH
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF JASON RUSCH
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF DOROTHY E LITTRELL
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON BEECH
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF MILTON RODRIGUEZ
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF EPIFANO GALLEGOS
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF LILY MAGRUDER
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11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF LAVERE W. RAWLINS
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF RULON YORGASON

11-23-07
11-23-07
11-23-07
12-03-07

12-03-07
12-11-07
12-11-07
12-17-07
12-17-07
12-17-07
12-17-07
12-17-07
12-17-07
12-18-07
12-18-07
12-19-07
12-20-07
12-20-07
12-20-07
12-21-07

12-24-07
12-28-07
12-28-07
12-31-07

12-31-07
01-11-08
01-11-08
01-11-08
01-11-08

Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF F CRAIG HAZEN
Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES L MAGRUDER
Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF SENORINA FERNANDEZ
Filed: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO FILE OVER-LENGTH OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M
Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR FEES
Filed: ExParte Application for Leave to File an Over-Length
Memorandum
Filed: The Ogden City Defendants Reply to Plaintiffs Response
and Opposition to Defendants Motion for Fees
Filed: REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
Fee Account created
Total Due:
10J00
Fee Account created
Total Due:
11 47
AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES
POSTAGE-COPIES
Payment Received:
1.47
Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO FEE AFFIDAVIT OF STAN PRESTON
Fee Account created
Total Due:
15.00
VIDEO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
15.00
Note: 20.00 cash tendered.
5 change given.
Note: Video of 10/23/07 hearing copied and mailed to Jason
Hawkins.
Note: FILE TO PRB WITH REQUEST TO SUBMIT
Filed: Motion FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
Filed by: ECHARD, ROBERT A
Filed: AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
Note: Copied CD of October 23, 2007 hearing for Ray Kimber.
Notified Mr. Kimber CD ready for pickup. Placed in pickup
basket in clerks' office.
Filed: THE OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE
TO FEE AFFIDAVIT OF STAN PRESTON
Filed: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER ARTICLES
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M
Filed: MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER
ARTICLES
Filed: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE OVER-LENGTH OPPOSITION TO
GODFREY'S MOTION FOR FEES
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M
Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MATTHEW GODFREY'S
MOTION FOR FEES
Fee Account created
Total Due:
3.00
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
3.00
Filed: REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR FEES
Filed: THE OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
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MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER ARTICLES
01-14-08 Filed: REPLY MEMO RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER
ARTICLES

01-15-08 Filed: REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
01-16-08 Filed: Notice to Submit PLAINTIFFS1 MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER
ARTICLES
01-28-08 Filed: NOTICE TO SUBMIT: MOTION FOR AWARD OF FEES
01-31-08 Note: NOTICE TO SUBMIT: MOTION FOR AWARD OF FEES TO PRB
02-22-08 Note: As the notice to submit concerning attorney fees from Bob
Echard was filed on 1/31/08 and involves the same issue of
defendant's fees, the under advisement review is continued.
02-29-08 Filed order: Memorandum Decision
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed February 29, 2008
03-05-08 Filed: NOTICE RE: RULE 41 DISMISSALS
03-10-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
03-10-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.47
03-10-08 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES, Mail Payment;
03-10-08 POSTAGE-COPIES
Payment Received:
1.47
03-11-08 Note: Video of 10/23/07 hearing copied and mailed to Jason
Hawkins.
03-17-08 Filed: NOTICE OF TENDER
03-31-08 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MANSELL AND WILLIAMS
MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS
03-31-08 Filed: DEFENDANTS MANSELL AND WILLIAMS 1 MOTION FOR RULE 11
SANCTIONS
Filed by: PRESTON, STANLEY J
03-31-08
Filed: Motion TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M
04-07-08 Note: MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT TO PRB CLERK
04-07-08 Case Disposition is Judgment
Disposition Judge is PARLEY R BALDWIN
04-07-08 Case Disposition is Dismissed
Disposition Judge is PARLEY R BALDWIN
04-08-08 Judgment Entered - Amount $15167.42
04-08-08 Filed judgment: Order: Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss,
Granting Defendants' Motions for Attorney Fees and Costs,
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Injunction and
Extraordinary Writ and Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Newspaper Article
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed April 04, 2008
04-10-08 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENTER
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT
04-15-08 Filed: RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' RULE 11 MOTION
04-15-08 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN M BARNARD
04-16-08 Filed: MEMO RE: MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
04-16-08 Filed: Motion TO VACATE JUDGMENT
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Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M
04-16-08 Filed: REPLY MEMO RE: MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT
04-16-08 Filed: Notice to Submit MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF
JUDGMENT

04-16-08 Filed: OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
VACATE JUDGMENT
04-18-08 Note: HOLD TIL 4-25-08
04-23-08 Note: File to PRB
04-23-08 Filed: Notice to Submit MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
04-25-08 Filed order: Order to Set Aside Judgment as to Don Wilson,
Brook Larsen, Laneil Larsen, and Robert Cato@J
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed April 24, 2008
04-25-08 Judgment # 1 Modified $ 15167.42
04-25-08 Judgment # 1 Modified $ 15167.42
04-25-08 Note: Both Judgments were modified removing Don Wilson, Brook
Larsen, Laneil Larsen and Robert Cato.
04-25-08 Filed: REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
04-25-08 Filed: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT O F DEFENDANTS MANSELL AND
WILLIAMS' MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS
04-30-08 Filed: OBJECTION TO & MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION OF REPLY MEMO
04-30-08 Filed: MEMORANDUM RE: OBJECTION TO & MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION
OF REPLY MEMO
04-30-08 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION AND
MOTION TO STRIEK PORTIONS OF REPLY MEMO
05-06-08 Filed: Notice to Submit RE: OBJECTION TO & MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTION OF REPLY MEMO
05-06-08 Filed: REPLY MEMO RE: OBJECTION TO & MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION
OF REPLY MEMO

05-08-08

Note: hold

ti.

5-23-08

05-27-08 Note: Entire file (3 volumes) and Notice to Submit Re:
Objection to & Motion to Strike Portion of Reply Memo sent to
PRB.
06-27-08 Filed order: Memorandum Decision
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed June 26, 2008
07-11-08 Filed: Request to Court Clerk
07-11-08 Filed: Satisfaction of Judgment @J
07-14-08 Judgment #1 Modified $ 15167.42 Disposition: Satisfied
07-29-08 Note: Rec'd Order: Granting the Ogden City Defendants' Motion
for Rule 11 Sanctions; Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike
Portions of Reply Memo: and Granting Plaintiff's Motion to
Enter Satisfaction of Judgment approved as to form. Sent to PRB
for signat
07-31-08 Filed order: Order: Granting the Ogden City Defendants' Motion
for Rule 11 Sanctions; Denying Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike
Portions of Reply Memo and Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter
Satisfaction of Judgment @J
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
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Signed July 29, 2008
08-19-08 Filed: NOTICE RE: COST BOND
08-19-08 Filed: MOTION TO SET SUPERCEDEAS BOND
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M
08-19-08 Note: Rec'd Order Setting Supercedeas Bond. Hold until 9/2.

08-19-08 Filed: Notice of Appeal
08-19-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
205.00
08-19-08 APPEAL
Payment Received:
205.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL, Mail Payment;
08-20-08 Bond Account created
Total Due:
205.00
08-20-08 Bond Account created
Total Due:
300.00
08-20-08 Bond Posted
Payment Received:
300.00
Note: Mail Payment;
08-21-08 Filed: Designation of Record for Appeal
08-25-08 Note: Rec'd Stipulation and Stipulated Order Setting
Supercedeas Bond.
08-27-08 Note: File with Stipulation and Order Setting Supercedeas Bond
sent to PRB for signature.
09-04-08 Filed order: STIUPLATED ORDER SETTING SUPERCEDEAS BOND
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed August 28, 2008
09-04-08 Filed order: STIPULATIN RE: SUPERCEDEAS BOND
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed August 21, 2008
09-04-08 Filed order: ORDER SETTING SUPERCEDEAS BOND
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed August 28, 2008
09-04-08 Note: Certified copy of notice of appeal sent to the Supreme
Court of Utah via interoffice mail.
09-04-08 Filed: Mailing Certificate
09-12-08 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Order
09-12-08 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Letter
09-16-08 Filed: Notice of Payment Re: Supercedeas Bond
09-17-08 Bond Account created
Total Due:
500.00
09-17-08 Bond Posted
Payment Received:
500.00
Note: Mail Payment;
09-18-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
150.00
09-18-08 REPORTER FEES
Payment Received:
150..00
Note: REPORTER FEES, Mail Payment;
10-01-08 Filed: Transcript of 10-23-07 motion hearing prepared by Diane
Flanagan.
10-01-08 Trust Account created
Total Due:
11.31
10-03-08 Filed: Court of Appeals Letter
10-07-08 REPORTER FEES
Transfer Out:
-11.31
Note: Account Transfer From Fee - REPORTER FEES On
070905792 To Trust - Other Trust On 070905792; Overpayment
on reporter fees
10-07-08 Other Trust
Transfer In:
11.31
10-08-08 Note: Appealed: Case #20080752
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10-09-08 Other Trust Check #
57130 Trust Payout:
11.31
10-15-08 Note: Record (4 volumes and 1 transcript sent to the Court of
Appeals via interoffice mail.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOROTHY E LITTRELL
et al
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF
ORAL ARGUMENTS

vs

Case No: 070905792 WR

CINDI MANSELL

Judge: fc>ARLEY R BALDWIN
Date:
October 10,2007

et al.,
Defendant.

ORAL. ARGUMENTS is scheduled.
Date: 10/23/2007
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN

Oral arguments for the request for an Injunction and ExtraordinaryWrit will be heard along with the Defendant' s Proposed Motion to
Dismiss.
Dated this

/ Q^~day of

Q

Ck) • , 20 CJ7.

District!-Court Deputy Clerk

Case No: 070905792
Date:
Oct 10, 2007
The Court will provide interpreters for criminal cases and domestic
violence cases involving protective orders or stalking injunctions.
(Fees in criminal cases may be imposed at the judge's discretion.)
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CASE PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at (801) 395-1071 (five days before
the hearing, if possible).
FOR ALL OTHER CASES, you must bring someone with you to
interpret. If you do not know someone who can help you, the names
of court interpreters you can hire are listed on the courts1
website at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/interp/certified.htm.
If you do not have access to the internet, ask the court clerk to
print off a copy of this list for you.
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) should call Stella Perea at (801)395-1062 at
least three working days prior to the proceeding. (For TTY service
call Utah Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711)
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Case No: 070905792
Date:
Oct 10, 2007
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 070905792 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

/(T

day of

NAME
BRIAN M BARNARD
Attorney PLA
214 EAST 5 00 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84111-3204
ROBERT A ECHARD
Attorney DEF
2491 WASHINGTON BLVD STE
200
OGDEN UT 844 01
D JASON HAWKINS
Attorney DEF
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR
P 0 BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84145-5000
STANLEY J PRESTON
Attorney DEF
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR
P O BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8-114 5

Orjr?

2o£T7 •

m—

Deputy Coti/t Cle
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: (801) 328-9531

USB # 0215

84111 -3204
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY and THE STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT

DOROTHY E. LITTRELL; JAMES R. BRILEY; et al,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

CINDIMANSELL, Ogden City Recorder;
GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney; and,
MATTHEW GODFREY,

PLAINTIFFS'
RESPONSE TO
MOTION
TO EXPEDITE

Civil No.
070905792

Defendants,

Defendants Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams, by and through counsel, moved this Court
for an order expediting briefing.
Defendants moved for an order awarding them attorney fees. Motion, 10/11/2007.
Plaintiffs' memo in opposition and in response to that motion is due Thursday, October 25, 2007.
Rule 7, Ut.R.Civ.Pro. There is no reason in law or in fact for expedited briefing or consideration
of that motion.
Defendants moved for an order expediting briefing in response to their motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs* response memo has been served ujpon defendants. Defendants'
motion to expedite briefing with regard to that motion is moot.

EXHIBIT
"G"

As per the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs shall shortly file and serve a reply
memo in further support of their petition and in reply to defendants' opposition memo (dated
10/11/2007).

DATED this 19th day of October, 2007.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Petitioners

o

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICp
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed (postage prepaid in the United States
Postal Service) and fax'ed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE MEMO RE:
MOTION TO EXPEDITE to:
STANLEY J PRESTON
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
11TH FLR
P.O. Box 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, Utah
84145

fax: (801) 363-0400

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Robert Echard & Associates, PC
2491 WASHINGTON BLVD STE 200
Ogden, Utah
84401

fax: (801) 393-2340

on the 19th day of OCTOBER 2007.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Petitioners

i

o

BRIAN M. BARNARD
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: (801) 328-9531

USB #0215

84111-3204
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY and THE STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT

DOROTHY E. LITTRELL; JAMES R. BRILEY; et al,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CINDI MANSELL, Ogden City Recorder;
GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney; and,
MATTHEW GODFREY,

NOTICE RE:
PLAINTIFFS'
RESPONSE TO
MOTION FOR FEES

Civil No.
070905792

Defendants,

Defendants Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams, by and through counsel, moved this Court
for an order awarding them attorney fees. Motion, 10/11/2007. Plaintiffs' memo in opposition
and in response to that motion is due Thursday, October 25, 2007.: Rule 7, Ut.R.Civ.Pro. There
is no reason in law or in fact for expedited briefing or consideration of that motion.
Plaintiffs shall file a response as per the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2007.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Pletitioners

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed (postage prepaid in the United States
PostaJ Service) and fax'ed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE RE: RESPONSE
MEMO RE: MOTION FOR FEES to:
STANLEY J PRESTON
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
11TH FLR
P.O. Box 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, Utah
84145
ROBERT A. ECHARD
Robert Echard & Associates, PC
2491 WASHINGTON BLVD STE 200
Ogden,Utah
84401

fax:(801)363-0400

fax: (801) 393-2340

on the 19th day of OCTOBER 2007.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Petitioners

BRIAN MjJ&ARNARD

SNOW. CHRISTENSEN&MARTINEAU
RccJ L Marrineau
Stephen H. L'rquharr
Dav.d \V. Slavic
Brian P. Miller
A. Denn>< N«»rrv»n
J idith D Wolferts
Allan L. Larson
ke.rh A. Call
J.-hn E. Cue
Kara L. Pcrtif
Kim R \ViI>on
Heather S.WTutc
Michael R OrUron
Robert R Harrison
D.n.d G.WMliams
Robert W. Thompson
Rc.x E. Mailscn
Svott H. Martin
M.ix D. Whedcr
Joseph P. Barrett
D.iv»d W. Slaughter
Trystan B. Smith
Stanley J. Preston
Maralyn M. Rc^er
Shawn E. Draney
Kenneth L Reich
John R. Lund
Bradley R. Blackham
Rodney R. Parker
D. Javm Hawkins
Richard A. Van Wigoncr Richard A. Vazquez
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Brian M. Barnard
Utah Legal Clinic, Inc.
214 East 500 South
Salt lake City. Utah 84] 11
Re:

Dorothy Littrell, et al v. Cindi Mamell, et ai
Case No. 070905792

Dear Mr. Barnard:
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure we hereby provide notice that
we intend to file a motion for sanctions against you and the Utah Legal Clinic, Inc. The position
being advocated by your clients in the above-referenced case is npt supported by the relevant
facts or applicable law, and appears to be aimed at improperly influencing the outcome of the
upcoming mayoral election. The frivolous nature of the lawsuit ijs demonstrated by the Motion to
Dismiss, Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and the consolidated supporting memorandum
that we have filed with the Court, which had to be filed immediately given the expedited relief
sought by your clients. We will hold off filing a formal Rule 11 ^notion until expiration of the 21
days safe harbor deadline. If the Complaint has not been voluntarily withdrawn before then, we
will proceed to file our Rule 11 motion.
Very truly vours.
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